Public Employee Strikes, Executive

Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers
Bernard D. Meltzert and Cass R. Sunsteintt
On August 3, 1981, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO") launched the first completely nationwide
and undisguised strike in history against the federal government.
President Reagan, true to his word,1 ordered the discharge of striking controllers who had not returned to work within a two-day
grace period.2 Up to the time of this writing, the Administration
has rejected all suggestions for a general amnesty. Its position has
been that the strikers, by violating federal laws and their no-strike
oath, 4 have forfeited their jobs with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") forever.'
t Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
it Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Professor Sunstein was an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice when the air traffic
controllers' strike ocdurred. The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
For their careful reading of, and thoughtful comments on, an earlier draft, we are indebted to Douglas Baird, Mary Becker, Ronald Coase, Frank Easterbrook, William Landes,
John Langbein, Daniel J. Meltzer, Phil C. Neal, and Geoffrey Stone.
We are also indebted to Elizabeth Perdue, J.D. 1982, and Roy Underhill, class of 1984,
The University of Chicago Law School, for their valuable research and comments, and to
Phil Curtis, Chicago class of 1984 and a former air traffic controller, for his experienced
insights.
Finally, we have been helped by other air traffic controllers, strikers and nonstrikers,
and by participants in, or close observers of, the events discussed below. In particular, we
thank Edward Curran, of the Federal Aviation Administration, for improving our sources of
information and perspective.
Naturally, no one who helped us is responsible for any errors that appear below.
' See President's Statement Concerning Air Traffic Controllers Strike, 17 WsKLY
Comp. PRES. Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981).
1 See DAnY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, at D-1 (Aug. 6, 1981) (statement of Donald J.
Devine, Director of the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")).
3 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976).

' This oath is required by 5 U.S.C. § 3333 (1976) and includes the following: "I am not
participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency
thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United
States or an agency thereof." See United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1233 n.6 (5th Cir.
1983).
' The Reagan Administration fluctuated as to whether the strikers were to be barred
only from federal air traffic controllers' jobs or from all federal employment, and if so, for
how long. Compare DAny LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, at D-1 (Aug. 6, 1981) (statement of
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This strike and the government's unusually stern response
have stirred large issues, involving the role and limits of law in
dealing with labor-management relations, the scope and exercise of
executive discretion with respect to strikers, and the soundness of
current mechanisms governing labor relations in the public sector.
These concerns reflect an undercurrent of renewed doubt about
the wisdom of blanket proscriptions of strikes by public employees.
In the past such doubts had worked together with fear of political
and economic reprisals from unions and other opponents of antistrike laws to eviscerate enforcement of the proscription. Enforcement had, in fact, been so lax and erratic as to approach a de facto
recognition of "illegal" public employee strikes as a regular part of
the negotiating process.' Although this breakdown was more pervasive in local government, it had occurred in the federal sector as
well and had even involved past job actions by air controllers. 7 De-

Donald J. Devine, Director of OPM) with Oversight of the Air Traffic ControllerSituation:
Hearings before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 97th Cong., 1st Seas.
52-54 (1981) (statement of J. Lynn Helms, FAA Administrator) [hereinafter cited as October 1981 Hearings]. On December 9, 1981, President Reagan announced that strikers would
be immediately eligible for employment in any branch of the federal government except the
FAA. President's Statement Concerning Air Traffic Controllers, 17 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES.
Doc. 1364 (Dec. 9, 1981). For an accompanying explanation by Secretary of Transportation
Drew Lewis, see [July-Dec.] Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 942, at 51-52 (1981).
The Administration also wavered over whether the "perpetual" ban against reemployment of strikers as controllers was by law mandatory or was discretionary and reversible in
the future. (This question is discussed in detail infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.)
Compare DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, at D-1 (Aug. 6, 1981) (Devine's statement that
permanent bar was discretionary and reversible) with October 1981 Hearings,supra, at 53
(Helms's qualified statement that permanent bar was mandatory). The House Committee's
chairman, Representative Ford, also urged that the ban was discretionary. Id. at 57. For
Devine's later efforts to reconcile the apparent conflict within the Administration, see Air
Traffic Control Revitalization Act of 1981: Hearingson H.R. 5038 before the House Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 123 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited
as 1981-82 Hearings].
The government softened or clarified its reactions in other ways. The FAA agreed to
reinstate strikers who showed that they were harassed into joining the strike. See [JulyDec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 926, at 12 (1981). Similarly, the Defense Department lifted a ban on military enlistment by the striking controllers. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
11, 1981, at A32, col. 4. Finally, the FAA waived discipline of strikers who had returned to
work within the President's 48-hour grace period. See [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 926, at 12 (1981); Chicago Tribune, Feb. 23, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
6 See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HA~v. L. REv.
459, 462-63 (1971).
See

MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE FEDERAL AvIATION AD-

73 (Mar. 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as JONES REPORT], prepared by a task
force designated by Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis and FAA Administrator J.
Lynn Helms. That report was prepared by Lawrence M. Jones (Chmon.), David G. Bowers,
and Stephen H. Fuller, assisted by the Institute for Social Research and McKinsey & Company, Inc. The Jones Report is reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 399. For a
MINISTRATION
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spite a series of unusual warnings from the three branches of government, PATCO and its members may have concluded that once
again a strike would not cost any of them their jobs for long.'
We propose to examine the particulars of the PATCO affair,
with the hope of getting a better idea of both its roots and its
larger implications for federal labor policy. We proceed as follows.
In part I, for general background, we explore the considerations
underlying the prevailing ban on public sector strikes. In part II,
we discuss the peculiar circumstances of the PATCO strike and the
government's response. In part III, we discuss a cluster of legal
problems raised by the strike: the history and constitutionality of
the statutory provisions, the extent of the President's discretion to
discharge and rehire strikers, and the problems of selective prosecution raised by the policies of the Department of Justice. In concluding, we venture some more general observations on the
PATCO affair and its implications for labor relations in the public
sector.

I.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES: THE LEGAL SETTING

We begin with a description of elements of the received wisdom justifying existing labor policies in the private sector. We
stress the word "description," for it is not our purpose to scrutinize
the rationale for private sector policies. We propose, instead, to accept the validity of those policies and to explore the justifications
for the wholly different policies that prevail in the public sector
with respect to the right to strike.
In the private sector, unions are generally regarded as indispensable for a private negotiation system9 that both redresses the
"unequal bargaining power" postulated for the individual em-

more detailed examination of prior job actions, see Comment, The Legal Consequences of a
DeliberateAir Traffic ControllerSlowdown, 8 N. Ky. L. REV. 155 (1981); see also PATCO v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 585 n.81 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court actions resulting from PATCO's 1970 "sick-out").
8 During poststrike hearings, Representative Ford spoke of a form of equitable estoppel, from the "Government's own previous action" regarding illegal strikes, which might
have led a fence-sitting controller "to believe that he could demonstrate his unhappiness for
a reasonable period of time." October 1981 Hearings,supra note 5, at 58-59.

'

See generally F.

TANNENBAUM,

A

PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR

(1951); Cox, The Uses and

Abuses of Union Power, 35 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 624, 624-27 (1960); Meltzer, Some Introductory Observations, Symposium on Labor Union Power and the Public Interest, 35 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 595, 596-97 (1960) and references contained therein; Summers, Past Premises,
Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 9-14
(1982).
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ployee l ° and that simultaneously gives employees a voice in the
formulation and administration of the web of rules surrounding
the workplace.11 It might, of course, be possible to administer such
a system without recognizing a right to strike. But despite their
costs, strikes are generally accepted as the necessary motive power
for such a system, for if strikes were not permitted, unions would
lack the power to accomplish the purposes for which they were created. As some economists would put it, unions, like other cartels,
could not achieve their purposes without the power concertedly to
withhold supply in order to support the prices (or wages) they demand. Finally, unions independent of the government, equipped
with a right to strike, have become an important symbol of civil

liberty.

12

In the United States, the values, rules, and rhetoric related to
strikes have been markedly different in the public sector: the prevailing policy prohibits strikes by all public employees.13 As applied to employees of the federal government, this policy is reflected in a number of statutory provisions, one of which makes
strikes by employees of the federal government a crime.14 On the
surface, there is a paradoxical element in these differing policies
10

See, e.g., S. RRP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935) (reporting S. 1958, 74th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR

ACT, 1935, at 2300, 2302 (1949). S. 1958, introduced by Senator Wagner, after
minor amendments became the original National Labor Relations Act. For evaluations of
the bargaining power rationale, see B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 56-57 (2d ed. 1977) (notes 2 and 3). For expressions of increasing concern about
the social costs of stoppages in the private sector, see references in id. at 1075.
" See generally Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PuB. INTEREST, Fall
1979, at 69.
12 During the period discussed here, that symbol was enhanced by the dramatic career
of Solidarity in Poland. Indeed, President Reagan himself has written, "I ... continue to be
a strong believer in the rights of unions, as well as in the rights of individuals. I think we
have the right as free men to refuse to work for just grievances: the strike is an unalienable
weapon of any citizen." R. REAGAN WITH R. HUBLER, WHERE'S THE REST OF ME? 138 (1965).
There are, of course, important qualifications on the right to strike even in the private
sector, extending, for example, to strikes violating no-strike pledges, see Boys Mkts., Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), and strikes causing national emergencies, see United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (per curiam). See infra
note 24 and accompanying text.
13 See G. ABOUD & A. ABOUD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 17-36 (2d
ed. 1982); Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerationsin Defining the Tort Liability
of Public Employee Unions to Private Citizens for Damages Inflicted by Illegal Strikes, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1271, 1271-72 (1982); J. Baird & J. Leavall, Strike Litigation and Remedies in
the Public Sector 1-2 (unpublished manuscript, presented at the annual meeting of the ABA
Section of Labor and Employment Law, Aug. 11, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
RELATIONS

14 See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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for private and public employment. The government protects the
right of private employees to strike while denying that right to its
own employees. What accounts for this disparity in treatment?
More particularly, why should strikes by air controllers, who happen to work for the government, be a criminal offense while
equally disruptive strikes by airplane pilots, who work for privately
owned companies, are protected by law? 1 5 We generalize and explore that question, first, because it forms an important part of the
backdrop for the federal antistrike law that dominated the PATCO
affair, and, second, because of its crucial importance to claims of
the unconstitutionality of that law that surface from time to time.
Three basic arguments are said to justify the prohibition on
strikes by public employees: the first invokes notions of sovereignty; the second relies on the assertedly essential nature of services performed in the public sector; and the third draws upon the
different roles of market forces in the private and public spheres.
In condemning public sector strikes, an earlier tradition relied
heavily on the sovereignty of the public employer and on the related idea of illegal delegation of authority.16 The first notion was
that the government, as sovereign, had plenary power to control
the terms on which its employees worked; the second was that an
unlawful delegation of power would be involved if the government
accorded to its employees and unions the authority to dictate
terms of employment. The notion of unlawful delegation cannot, of
course, be sustained today.1" Furthermore, the "sovereignty" rationale was, in this context, a question-begging term that identified
the government's power but did not speak to the question of how it
should be exercised in a representative democracy.18 But before
15A massive railway or airline strike would not necessarily be illegal under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976), but experience suggests that the likelihood of congressional intervention to avert or end a stoppage of all or a substantial part of either industry would be strong. For a summary of such legislation, see Roukis, Should the Railway
Labor Act Be Amended?, 38 ARB. J. 16, 16-17 (1983). Even though such direct intervention

has involved railways rather than airlines, large scale airline stoppages might well invite
similar intervention.
14 See G. ABOUD & A. ABOUD, supra note 13, at 5-7; NEW YORK GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 12-13 (1966) ("Taylor Committee") [hereinafter cited as TAYLOR REPORT], summarized in [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 135, at D-1 (1966); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 36-39
(1971).
'7 See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv.

L. REv. 1667 (1975); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980).
18 H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 37-38. But see Petro, Sovereignty
and Compulsory Public-SectorBargaining,10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 25 (1974), for a vigor-
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those criticisms did their work, four Presidents had delivered
sweeping condemnations of public employee strikes that reflected
the now largely discredited simplicities of the notion of sovereignty. Such statements-by Presidents Woodrow Wilson,19 Calvin
Coolidge,20 Herbert Hoover,21 and Franklin D. Roosevelt 22- - became celebrated ingredients of the antistrike rhetoric and were invoked long after the foundations of the sovereignty claim had been
undermined.
The second justification for the ban on public employee strikes
starts with the recognition that public employees frequently perform services that are properly regarded as essential. 3 Strikes by
ous defense of the idea of sovereignty and of the position that sovereignty is incompatible
with both compulsory bargaining and the right to strike in the public sector.
' "'[An intolerable crime against civilization'" was President Wilson's characterization of the 1919 Boston Police Strike. Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee, 1 LAB. L.J. 604, 612 (1950) (quoting President Wilson).
20 "'There is no right to strike against public safety by anybody anywhere at any
time,'" declared then-Governor Coolidge when he refused to reinstate the Boston policemen
who had struck in 1919. Id. (quoting then-Governor Coolidge).
21 While campaigning for the presidency in 1928, Herbert Hoover said
"'the government by stringent civil service rules must debar its employees from their
full political rights as free men. It must limit them in the liberty to bargain for their
own wages, for no government employee can strike against his government and thus
against the whole people. It makes a legislative body, with all its political currents,
their final employer and master. Their bargaining does not rest upon economic need or
economic strength but on political potence."'
S. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 6 (1948) (quoting N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1928, (quoting

H. Hoover)).
22In a 1937 letter to the president of the National Federation of Federal Employees,
President Roosevelt said
"A strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part
to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action,
looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it[,] is
unthinkable and intolerable.
"....

[P]articularly I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have

no place in the function of any organization of government employees."
Vogel, supra note 19, at 612 (quoting letter from Franklin Roosevelt to the President of the
National Federation of Federal Employees (Aug. 16, 1937)).
23 There is a considerable controversy regarding the feasibility of distinguishing between "essential" and "unessential" services, either at the outbreak of strikes or after particular strikes have continued for a time, with the result that services initially unessential
might become essential as the strike continues. Strikes by teachers, sanitation workers, or
mailers of welfare checks come to mind. See generally H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra
note 16, at 190-201; Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67
MICH. L. REV. 943, 948-56 (1969); Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of
Canada:Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 MICH. L. REV. 971, 988-90 (1969); Burton &
Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 43240 (1970); Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L.
REV. 357, 376-78 (1972).

If "nonessential" employees were granted the right to strike, it might well be more diffi-
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public employees could therefore inflict substantial harm on the
community; obvious examples include a strike by urban police or
firefighters, or by defense department employees during a national
emergency. One could also include an extended strike by those entrusted with providing subsistence benefits to the indigent, at least
if the beneficiaries could not obtain credit or other assistance during the strike. In view of the injury flowing from stoppage of such
services, allowing strikes could subject public officials to strong
pressures for quick settlement, give undue power to some or all
public employees, and bear heavily on vulnerable citizens. The distinction between public and private employees under this view is
justified not by question-begging notions of sovereignty or by outmoded conceptions of delegation, but by functional considerations
relating to the nature of the tasks performed in the public and private spheres.
To a substantial extent the argument from essential services
has force; the obvious difficulty is that it is overbroad. Federal employees often perform important services, but some of their work
plainly is not essential; indeed, most citizens have a list of government services that would not be missed-to put their view mildly.
Surely, in the general run of cases, no catastrophe would result if
employees of the American Battle Monuments Commission were
permitted to go on strike. Perhaps, then, the most that can be said
for the argument is that many public employees do perform essential services; what is basically involved is a continuum from more
to less essential, without generally accepted criteria for deciding
where on that continuum different services, in different locales,
and in different time frames should be located. These considerations suggest that any distinction between essential and nonessential services might be too ill-defined and troublesome to be worthwhile. The argument, however, does not adequately support a
blanket proscription on public employee strikes any more than the
difficulties of applying the national emergency limitation on private sector strikes2 4 warrants their complete prohibition.

cult to enforce a strike ban against "essential employees," for they might believe that other
employees were improving their relative position through strikes and that the denial of the
strike weapon to "essentials" was unfair. This perception of unfairness would, of course, be
strengthened if particular distinctions between "essential" and other activities appeared to
be arbitrary. On the other hand, the widespread flouting of a blanket ban may, under present circumstances, encourage essential employees, such as police and firefighters, to resort
to strikes, as has increasingly been the case.
24 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176180 (1976). These provisions ultimately authorize an injunction if a strike or lockout, actual

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:731

The third justification for the strike ban was highlighted in
the 1950's and 1960's, as local governments responded to sharp increases in the numbers2 5 and militancy e of public employee unions
by establishing task forces charged with proposing suitable policies. The resulting reports examined what appeared to be the special characteristics of public employee labor relations and considered the applicability of private sector policies to public
employees. Among the most influential reports was that issued in
1966 by the New York Governor's Committee, under the chairmanship of George W. Taylor. That report, and the more extensive
commentaries 28 that followed, argued that the proscription of public employee strikes was justified by virtue of the different forces
that determined compensation and the level of services in the private and public sectors, respectively.
In the private sector, the employee benefits embodied in col-

or prospective, will "imperil the national health or safety." Id. § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1976).
Those terms and .their application involve considerable uncertainty. See the opinions in
United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 42 (per curiam), 47 (Frankfurter &
Harlan, JJ., concurring), 65 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1959); Jones, Toward a Definition of
"NationalEmergency Dispute," 1971 Wis. L. REv. 700, 710. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra note 51 and accompanying text.
11 See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 336 (1976); B. MELTZER,
supra note 10, at 50-51; Bowman & Morlan, Revised projections of the U. S. economy to
1980 and 1985, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1976, at 9.
26 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 437, WORK STOPPAGES

IN GOVERNMENT, 1973 (1975); B. MELTZER, supra note 10, at 53 (Table 13).
217TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 16. The Taylor Committee's recommendations were
summarized in [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 135, at D-1 (1966). In addition
to Chairman Taylor the committee consisted of E. Wight Bakke, David L. Cole, John T.

Dunlop, and Frederick H. Harbison. See also ILLINOIS

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON

LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1967) (agreeing with Taylor Committee that public employee strikes should be unequivocally prohibited), reprinted in [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1
(1967). But cf. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1968) (advocating that public employees, except for
policemen and firemen, be given a limited right to strike), reprinted in [July-Dec.] Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 251, at E-1 (1968); REPORT TO GOVERNOR ROMNEY BY THE MICHIGAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (1966) (although agreeing with
the continuance of the no-strike policy, the Committee questioned the validity of this approach), reprinted in [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at F-1 (1967). See
generally Smith, State & Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 893-94 (1969). For a more recent challenge to the public-private distinction-precipitated by the recent PATCO strike-see Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 1055 (1982).
28 See, for example, Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargainingin Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969), the reply of Burton & Krider, supra note 23, and
the authors' rejoinder in H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 16, and Wellington &
Winter, StructuringCollective Bargainingin Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970).
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lectively bargained agreements are shaped by two important elements. The first is the employer's countervailing powers to assume
the costs of a (long) strike, to lock out, to eliminate high-cost operations or to shift them to other plants or other firms, or to close
down completely. The second consists of market forces that create
direct links among an employer's costs, prices, output, and employment. The power of these market restraints varies with the ease of
substituting other products and other suppliers when costs and
prices in a particular firm or industry. rise. But in general, higher
wages secured by the exercise of collective power tend to result in
higher prices and lower production and employment. That prospect will often temper wage demands and concessions in the private sector.
Such market restraints are not, of course, effective in all parts
of the private sector. Indeed, in some organized industries, such as
steel and autos, their ineffectiveness, along with managerial deficiencies, appears to have contributed to the erosion of market positions. As a general rule, however, these constraints, registering consumer choices, make the private sector significantly different from
the public sector. Indeed, even when the ineffectiveness of market
restraints permits the union to impose high labor costs, such costs
may cause employers to change production methods or to replace
high-cost production with lower-cost foreign or domestic supplies.
In the public sector, no such direct and sharply focused constraints operate through the price mechanism.2 9 The consumer receives many important services-for example, education, police,
and fire- protection-without directly paying for them.3 0 Further-

29 It is true, of course, that public employers, in the longer run at least, cannot meet
their needs unless public pay reflects private compensation standards-the market provides
some protection against unduly low compensation. H. WELLINGTON & R. WiraR, supranote
16, at 18. The effectiveness of these forces may be blunted when a group of employees has
developed skills suitable only for public employment. With respect to such employees, an
employer, private or public, may be viewed as having strong monopsony power. That power
is limited, however, by the costs to the employer in training the employees involved. As a

result there is a joint employee-employer interest in not destroying job-specific skills, which
presumably will be reflected in compensation. The air traffic controllers, because of the high
training costs incurred by the government, illustrate the high costs to an employer of losing
job-specific skills-at least where the jobs involved are not over-manned. Moreover, even in
such circumstances, economic criteria or use of the cheapest feasible wage scale will be qualified because public sector activities are not dominated by a desire for monetary profits.
Government is thus less likely to exploit whatever market power it may have. Id. On the
other hand, government, because of political impediments to raising revenue and compensation, may be more sluggish in adjusting to upward wage pressures.
3o When a state-owned facility (such as an electric plant or a subway) charges a price
for its services and pays its own way, its wage-setting, in contrast to wages for price-free
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more, the costs of such services are typically buried in complex
budgets, which taxpayers can rarely master. Budgetary and taxing
decisions by legislatures-which are products of public policy,
rather than market forces-are the dominant factors, at least in
the short run, in determining the level of public employee
compensation.3 1
In making such policy decisions, legislatures must respond to
their constituencies, including public employee unions, consumers
of particular services, and taxpayers. Although taxpayers are the
largest constituency, their interests qua taxpayers are typically
more diffuse than the concentrated interests of public employees
and of consumers of particular public services, who may also be
taxpayers. The result is that labor unions, with the sharply focused
interests of a narrow bloc, frequently have a louder voice than
larger and more diffuse constituencies.32 Even though union leverage may seem limited in a particular situation, its existence is
likely to make legislators more forthcoming. If the right to strike
were granted to public employee unions, there would be a substantial risk of conferring on such unions undue power over the
budget-power that would be constrained neither by market forces
nor by countervailing political forces.3
To say this is not to deny that there are restraints in the public sector that resemble those in the private sector. Thus public
employees might be restrained by the prospect of lost wages by
virtue of strikes, lockouts, or contracting out. Similarly, the fear of

services, will be more directly subject to market forces. But even as to revenue-producing
publicly owned operations, various subsidies, sometimes from several layers of government,
may cushion the impact of market forces.
31

H. WELLINGTON & R.

WINTER,

supra note 16, at 27.

This phenomenon is, of course, familiar in administrative law. See generally Stewart
& Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HAav. L. REV. 1193 (1982); cf. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGmT. ScI. 3, 3 (1971) (suggesting
that as a rule, regulation is "acquired" by powerful interest groups and is designed and
operated primarily for their benefit).
33 It has been suggested that the notion of an unfair advantage conferred by legalization of strikes has been undermined by evidence of public employers' recent and significant
refusals to capitulate to the demands of unions permitted to strike. See Olson, The Use of
the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 494, 495 (1982). Such evidence
is, however, far from convincing. The legality of a strike, among other pressures, is presumably a factor in the original demands and ultimate sticking points of both unions and employers. The refusal of an employer to accept the union's demand-which may be higher
because of legal strike power-does not help us measure that power. Previously, employers
in the private sector, when they faced unions with admittedly great power (for example,
steel and autos), sometimes refused to capitulate. We will not here attempt to be more
precise about "power" in this context. For further discussion, see Meltzer, supra note 9, at
597-601.
32
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unemployment caused by increased labor costs and declining tax
revenues might restrain the ultimate demands of public unions.
And competition among various well-organized groups will provide
something of a check on the possibility that the budget will be captured by any particular faction. But such restraints operate more
crudely and diffusely than private market restraints. Where many
citizens view a service as important but do not pay for it directly, a
particular union may be able to maintain high wages while, in effect, imposing economies on areas more insulated against citizen
3 4
pressure and union power.
Taxpayers may also seek to escape from unwanted costs by
resort to "exit" as well as "voice." s5 But the adjustment costs of
exit, for example, of moving from New York City to Vermont or
Texas, usually appear to be much greater than those involved in
switching from a higher- to a lower-cost product.3 " For this reason
the potential restraint of "exit," even when combined with "voice,"
is typically much less effective than private market restraints. 7
And in the federal sphere, the exit route is not realistically available for most citizens.
Under this view, the prohibition on strikes by public employees is justified on the ground that such a right would give undue
power to a private faction over the public budget. The concern
about such imbalances of power reflects a desire to protect the institutions of a representative democracy 8 against the power of narrow interest groups,3 9 many of which could bring vital governmen-

34 Compare H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 1, setting forth this epigraph: "' "If the city has $2 billion a year for the bums on welfare, how come they have no
dough for us?" '" (quoting a New York City fireman quoted in N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1970,
§ 4, at 1, col. 1). See also id. at 27 n.45 (newspaper account of state urban aid funds, origi-

nally authorized for helping the poor, diverted to salary increases for firemen and police
after a strike).

3'See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
3 Burton, Public Sector Unionism: An Economic Perspective, Gov'T UNION REV.,
Spring 1982, at 26, 39.
37 Id.
3 See Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes Democracy, Gov'T UNION REV., Winter 1980, at 5. But see Cohen, Does Public Employee
Unionism Diminish Democracy?, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189 (1979).

3'Similar, but now quaint, concerns were expressed by Disraeli in the debate over an

amendment to the "Representation of the People Bill" (the Reform Bill of 1867), 30 & 31

Vict., ch. 102, that would have extended the franchise to public revenue officers. He observed that they already exerted an influence "which must be viewed with great jealousy."
He asked: "But what would be the position of affairs if these persons-so numerous a
body-were invested with the franchise?" He intimated that "the result would be that there
would be an organization illegitimately to increase the remuneration they received from
their services"--a remuneration which, in his opinion, was based upon a just estimate. 188
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tal services to a halt.
The foregoing arguments are not without their difficulties.
First, the central distinction between "economic" power, which is
crucial in the private sector, and "political" power, which is crucial
in the public sector, is not clear-cut.40 Thus, executive intervention
or abstention in private bargaining situations 41 may affect the
shape of private collective bargains; similar consequences may
arise from legislation, such as minimum wages, tariffs, and regulation restricting new entrants and facilitating the passing on of increased costs to consumers. Even if the distinction between "economic" and "political" power could be clearly drawn, it does not
tell us why the use of one form of power should be permissible and
the other proscribed. 2 The exertion of political power by interest
groups is a familiar part of the political process. 3 Public sector
strikes designed to affect action by legislatures or administrators
might therefore be viewed as conventional "political" action no different in principle from lobbying." With lobbying, political power
is affected by the intensity, numbers, and wealth of the groups involved. With strikes, influence is a function in part of a group's
power to disrupt essential services as well as its ability to enlist the
aid of other entities, public and private. To be sure, strikes are, at
least in the short run, more disruptive than lobbying. But in a
community that protects strikes in the private sector, despite their
disruptive potential, it is not self-evident why one form of
power-lobbying and some kinds of campaign contributions-is

PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 1033-34 (1867). The amendment was lost, id. at 1036, but a similar
provision carried the following year, 1868. See 193 id. at 389-410 (1868).
Gladstone, although supporting the enfranchisement, made a statement not wholly irrelevant to the PATCO affair, given the large queue of applicants for air traffic controller

jobs:

"What, he asked, was the Civil Service of this country? It was a service in which there
was a great deal of complaint of inadequate pay, of slow promotion, and all the rest of
it. But, at the same time, it was a service which there was an extraordinary desire to
get into. And whose privilege was it to regulate that desire? That of the Members of
that House ....
"
H.R. MEYER, THE BRITISH STATE TELEGRAPHS 98 (1907) (quoting Gladstone).
"' See Burton & Krider, supra note 23, at 428-30.
41Extrastatutory, as well as statutory, executive involvement in large-scale private sector disputes is not infrequent. See, e.g., M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE
(1977); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY 203

(1961).
42 See Burton & Krider, supra note 23, at 428-32.

4' See generally A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); G. MCCONNELL,
(1966); D.
(2d ed. 1971); Stigler, supra note 32.
44 Burton & Krider, supra note 23, at 430.
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
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permitted while strikes are completely proscribed.
Such criticisms suggest that the differences in checks on collective power and the role of "politics" in the two sectors are in the
end not bright lines but matters of degree.4 5 Moreover, the effects
of strikes, or other forms of private sector self-help, on the
processes of governmental decision making depend on the character and perceived importance of the work, the size and the alliances of particular bargaining units, and the social and political
context of the public employer involved. It is therefore difficult to
evaluate the argument from differential market forces in the abstract. Nonetheless, the argument does suggest that there are significant differences, even if of degree, between the private and
public sectors and that these differences provide a more than plausible basis for the prohibition on public employee strikes. When
the argument from those differences is linked with that from essential services, we believe that a persuasive case can be made in
favor of the prohibition, at least if labor-management institutions
in the public sector appear to provide a reasonable accommodation
of the interests of public sector employees.
Empirical studies suggest that such accommodation has been
achieved, at least with respect to wages and fringe benefits. Such
studies do not suggest that public compensation suffers by comparison with private compensation; indeed, the compensation of federal employees appears to be higher than that of private counterparts. 46 And when the focus shifts to so-called "noneconomic"
4'See H.

WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 32; Kaden, Book Review, 81
L.J. 772, 778 (1972) (reviewing H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE
CITIES (1971)).
48 Inter-sector comparisons are, of course, complicated by the difficulty of finding "comparable" jobs and of weighing pertinent qualitative differences. See Munnell & Connelly,
Comparability of Public and Private Compensation: The Issue of Fringe Benefits, NEw
ENG. ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 27, 29.
These difficulties aside, almost all studies find that on the average wages and fringes at
the federal level are higher than in the "comparable" private position. See, e.g., S. SmrrH,
EQUAL PAY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: FACT OR FANTASY 68 (1977); Mitchell, The Impact of
Collective Bargainingon Compensationin the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING
118, 123 (B. Aaron, J. Grodin, J. Stern eds. 1979). One study found, however, that in 1961
there was a wage disadvantage at the higher federal levels (GS-7 through GS-15). Stelluto,
FederalPay Comparability:Facts to Temper the Debate, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1979,
at 18, 26. Furthermore, another study concluded that compensation of state and local government employees, although showing wide variations, was overall somewhat lower than
that of private counterparts. See Mitchell, supra, at 123-24.
With respect to public sector strikes and representative government, it should be observed that an impressionistic study of New York City highlights that collective bargaining,
coupled with strikes (albeit illegal ones) by public employees, not only contributed to the
city's fiscal crises but also basically altered the nature of public services and the functions of
YALE
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considerations, such as protection of employees against arbitrary
actions and procedures, the protections furnished in the public sector measure up to private counterparts. 7
Analytical distinctions between the two sectors do not, however, address an imponderable factor-perceptions that the "right
to strike" in the public sector, as in the private sector, is a fundamental right that free societies recognize and only oppressive governments deny.48 The acceptance of that premise leads to a set of
related arguments to the effect that the right to strike, as the mark
of a free society, should not be denied unless a strike would substantially injure paramount interests of the larger community; even
then strikes should not be prohibited without a strike substitute,
that is, a neutral dispute-settling mechanism, such as some form of
arbitration.4 9 Critics of a blanket proscription concede that there
may be difficulties in distinguishing between more essential and
less essential activities; they urge, however, that manageable distinctions" are available, that such distinctions do not pose essentially greater difficulties than those in the private sphere, 51 and
that, in any event, the application of such distinctions will cause
fewer problems than a blanket no-strike approach. The complete
prohibition of public sector strikes, the argument continues, must
be viewed as an oblique undercutting of the idea of union representation and collective negotiations in the public sector and in the
private sector as well. 52 In addition, whatever the analytical justifi-

the mayor, the city council, and the agency heads. See K.

AULETrA, THE STREETS WERE

PAVED WITH GOLD 45-51, 59-62, 66-68, 185-86 (1980).
47

Protections in the public sector against unwarranted discipline were achieved

through civil service reform, even before such protections became staples of private sector
collective agreements. See generally R. DWOSKIN, RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIc EMPLOYEE (1978);
Note, Federal Employment-The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978-Removing Incompetents and Protecting "Whistle Blowers," 26 WAYNE L. REV. 97 (1979). Statutory protections

are now reinforced by constitutional protections. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Furthermore, on the federal level employees have, in
general, been well protected. See R. DWOSIUN, supra; Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent
the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942 (1976); Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REV. 196 (1973).
Is See R. REAGAN WITH R. HBLER, supra note 12, at 138; Little, ArbitratingPublic
Employment Disputes, 68 A.B.A. J. 1100, 1100 (1982).
49 Little, supra note 48, at 1101-03.
50 Burton & Krider, supra note 23, at 432-38.
51 See id.; see generally United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959) (per
curiam); United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 418, 335 F. Supp. 501

(N.D. Ill.), application for emergency relief denied, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2801 (7th Cir.
1971); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 202-210 (as amended), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 172-180 (1976).
52

Kaden, supra note 45, at 779-80.
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cation for such a proscription, it may well not work. It may, as a
formal matter, make strikes illegal but it does not really stop
them. 53 For once organization exists,54 strikes will break out, at
least where a union has power; strikes are likely to produce economic gains for the strikers, and the moral acceptability of strikes
in general may dilute the deterrent force of strike prohibitions. A
paper prohibition against strikes, which is not enforced or is enforced most capriciously, will, it is urged, breed disrespect for law.
Later, we shall look more closely at the claim that the right to
strike by public employees is perceived by them and the general
society as involving a basic civil right and that it is ostrich-like to
disregard that perception in formulating public policy.55 For immediate purposes it is enough to note that the deterrent effect of a
prohibition on public employee strikes is significantly influenced
by the seriousness of the commitment both to the values underlying that prohibition and to the rule of law.
Those values appear to have retained their vitality in most
states; only a few states have rejected the prevailing blanket prohibition of public sector strikes.56 To be sure, cynics may say that
53 Some commentators have suggested that there is no empirical support
for the idea
that there is any connection between the amount of strike activity (on the state and local
level) and the particular public policies in force, including strike prohibitions. See J. BURTON & C. KRIDER, THE INCIDENCE OF STRIKES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 171 (1975) (illegal
strikes may be shorter). But other investigators have found that mechanisms that in fact
operate as strike substitutes, such as arbitration, can effectively reduce strikes. See C. OL-

SON, J. STERN, J. NAJIrrA, J. WEISBERGER, STRIKES AND STRIKE PENALTIES IN THE PUBLIC SEC-

TOR 127-28, 151-52, 362-67, 373-78 (1981). But these findings are guarded with caveats about
the dangers of extrapolation to states without much union organization. Furthermore, these
findings rest on data regarding only the number, and not the duration, of strikes. It seems
likely, however, that the illegality of a strike will tend to shorten it because pressure will be
generated not only by the loss of services, but also by the additional political costs and legal
risks inherent in continued law-breaking. In any event, proclamations about the irrelevance
of antistrike policies, among other public policies, involve the usual risk of self-fulfilling
prophecies.
Both the percentage of employees striking and the duration of strikes have been much
lower in the public than in the private sector. See B. MELTZER, supra note 10, at 52-53
(Tables 12-13); U.S. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1981, at 414 (102d ed. 1981); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 429-32

(1980).
4 See PUBLIC SERVIcE RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES (6th
ed. 1982).
85 See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
61 As of January 1, 1982, only nine states (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin) explicitly allow strikes in the public sector,
and each of those states places significant limits on the right to strike. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GAO REP. No. FPCD-82-49, COMPARISON OF COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED AND
ADMINISTRATIVELY SET PAY RATES FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYES 18-19, 28-29 app. V (1982);
Summary of State Labor Laws, Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 51:501
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the preservation of the strike prohibition is a charade-the preservation of a symbolic code despite (or because of) the awareness
that it will not be obeyed. But something more appealing and fundamental seems to be at work: a regard for the idea of public service,' of reciprocal obligations between the people and those who
serve them, and a preference for legislative dialogue, no matter
how imperfect, to economic and political warfare. Similarly, Congress, albeit with much sparser legislative debate than occurred in
some states, has maintained an absolute prohibition against all
strikes by federal employees and has sought to enforce it by severe
sanctions. It is against this background that the PATCO affair
occurred.
I. THE PATCO

AFFAIR

A. Preliminaries
Almost from its formation in 1968, PATCO showed a willingness to resort to self-help, in the form of slow-downs and strikes, to
remedy its stated grievances. The details of such job actions need
not detain us. 57 It is enough for our purposes to note several basic

points. First, the criminal law was apparently not invoked against
offenders. Second, the executive branch did not maintain that federal employees engaging in "strikes"5 8 would be ineligible for continued employment in their regular jobs; indeed the administrative
sanctions against PATCO and against individual controllers were
(1981).
It would be an oversimplification to infer from legislative failures to lift strike-prohibitions the existence of a solid consensus in favor of the prevailing antistrike policy. Legislative efforts to change that policy must overcome a cluster of differences, including those
between urban and rural areas, those among public sector unions regarding both the soundness of such legislation and the impact of existing political arrangements on their members,
and differences between employing units and legislative units, resulting from home-rule limitations. Cf. Derber, Labor-ManagementPolicy for Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Governor's Commission, 1966-67, 21 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 541, 552-58
(1968). Those factors, along with the difference between the abstract appeal of a no-strike
policy and the concrete pressures to settle a particular strike, may help to explain an apparent paradox, that is, unions' inability to eliminate a blanket strike ban despite their power
to extract significant gains, from negotiations, with or without a strike.
'7 See generally Comment, supra note 7.
" "Strike," as used in the federal antistrike law, has been defined so as to include slowdowns and other forms of concerted withdrawal of services falling short of a full-fledged
strike. See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C.) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH.
L. REv. 931, 935 (1969); Wortmann, Collective Bargaining Tactics in Federal Civil Service,
15 LAB. L.J. 482 (1964); Comment, Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees and the
Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. Rv.260, 263-65 (1969).
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relatively mild.5 9 Third, such sanctions were followed by progressively stronger and more overt union pressures.6 0 Fourth, PATCO's
job actions, though falling far short of a full stoppage, demonstrated its capacity to inflict substantial losses on the airlines and
the community at large.6" Finally, the unlawful conduct of air traffic controllers produced not only prospective injunctions and contempt actions against PATCO,6 2 but also judicial admonitions concerning both PATCO's duty to obey6" the antistrike law and the
Attorney General's duty to enforce it."
Despite those admonitions, PATCO's local at Chicago's
O'Hare airport mounted another challenge to the antistrike law
approximately one year before the 1981 nationwide strike. The local presented its demands, labeled them "nonnegotiable," and

5 For example, 67 controllers were fired for engaging in 1970 in a threatened sickout,
which was designed to bring about immediate recognition of PATCO and restoration of its
dues check-off. (The FAA had previously terminated the check-off and denied recognition to
PATCO because of the two-day sickout in 1969, responsibility for which PATCO disclaimed.) Those fired had been reinstated by 1972. See Miller v. Bond, 641 F.2d 997 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Comment, supra note 7, at 159-66.
" See Comment, supra note 7, at 166-72.
61 See generally id.
62 Cases resulting from the 1970 sick-out include Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 313 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y.) (preliminary injunction against strike coupled with order barring discipline by the government against returning strikers, pending further order of the court),
vacated in part sub nor. United States v. PATCO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970) (restraint on
discipline by government vacated, one judge dissenting), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
Contra United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1970) (restraint on discipline by
government upheld, one judge dissenting). Additional cases resulting from the 1970 sick-out
are collected in PATCO v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 585 n.81 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
In 1978, another job action by PATCO led to the decision in Air Transp. Ass'n v.
PATCO, 453 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y.) (ordering PATCO to pay the Association $25,000 for
each day of a four-day violation of the permanent 1970 injunction, the penalty stipulated in
a prior decree), aff'd, 594 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). This
contempt action led to a ruling that the 1970 injunction was prospective and applied to
future strikes triggered by controversies quite different from those leading to that injunction. 453 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
6 See Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 453 F. Supp. 1287, 1293-94 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 594
F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
" "It is also the sworn duty of the Attorney General to enforce these laws but for reasons not fathomable by this Court they have apparently yet to initiate any investigative or
enforcement proceedings." Id. at 1293 n.8. In a letter to Langhorne Bond, then FAA Administrator, the Justice Department explained that it had a "long-standing policy" not to "preliminarily initiate criminal prosecution" under 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976) and that the sudden
introduction 6f criminal penalties into a labor dispute would be unwise. The Justice Department also apparently felt that a criminal prosecution for the 1978 slow-down would have
been an unfair surprise-as the first prosecution in the then 23-year history of the antistrike
statute. See Letter from Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, to Langhorne M.
Bond (Sept. 22, 1978) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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threatened a "withdrawing of enthusiasm" by the controllers unless the FAA, within ten days, granted those demands or proved
that they would be implemented. 5 The nature of the demands
suggested that the O'Hare local was either bluffing or seeking to
test the government's will, for the local's deadline was obviously
too short for these extraordinary demands, which only Congress
could grant or (realistically) promise. When the FAA's Regional
Administrator asked for more time, the local accelerated its own
ten-day deadline. By August 15, 1980, more than 600 private and
commercial planes had experienced delays of over thirty minutes
during a twenty-one hour period, causing considerable loss and inconvenience to the airlines and to the public.6 6
Legal action was eventually instituted against the slow-down,
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it
had authority to enjoin strikes by federal employees. 6 7 On the
same day the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied PATCO's petition for a vacatur of that court's 1970
injunction against strikes,68 concluding that the passage of Title

65 This ultimatum was alleged in the government's petition for a preliminary injunction, August 17, 1980, in the federal district court; another allegation was that Richard
Scholz, the president of the O'Hare local, had demanded, by a letter dated July 30, 1978,
that the O'Hare tower immediately raise the grade of each of its controllers and grant each
of them a tax-free bonus of $7500. See United States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134, 1136 & n.1
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981). This demand for tax-free status seemed a
perverse kind of "public relations"; the contrbllers, by seeking a privileged status under the
tax laws, would scarcely make friends with other workers, who already felt the burden of
their own taxes and had frequently been reminded of them in the ongoing presidential
campaign.
Poli, PATCO's President, later explained this demand by claiming that the bonus had
been suggested in 1978 by FAA managers, in order to attract controllers to O'Hare, apparently not a magnet because of its high traffic volume. See Air Traffic Control: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 26 (1980) (statement of Robert Poli) [hereinafter cited as
September 1980 Hearings].
" See United States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134, 1136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
67 Id. at 1140, rev'g 504 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The trial court, in dismissing a
petition for a temporary injunction, had relied primarily on the ground that Title VII of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, tit. VII, §§ 701-703, 92 Stat. 1191-218
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5596(b)(1), 7101-7135, 7211 (Supp. V 1981)), by making strikes by
federal employees unfair labor practices, had divested the federal courts of injunctive jurisdiction. On appeal, a concurring judge, although acknowledging the sparse guidance provided by either the language or history of the Act, concluded from the legislative history
that Congress, by the Civil Service Reform Act, had not intended to alter either the preexisting strike prohibition or the preexisting sanctions, including injunctions, against unlawful
strikes. 653 F.2d at 1143-44 (Crabb, C.J., concurring). Accord United States v. Martinez, 686
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 667 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1981).
" See supra note 62.
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VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 19789 (the "1978 Reform
Act") had not divested the court of jurisdiction to protect the integrity of its prior order.70 Referring to newspaper stories indicating that PATCO was "on the very eve of another threatened
strike,"" the district court renewed its earlier warning regarding
72
the duty of PATCO's members to refrain from striking.
B. Antecedents to the Strike of August 1981
In this section we propose to describe briefly PATCO's two
apparently contradictory strategies: first, the build-up of rank-andfile support for a strike; second, substantially contemporaneous assurances to members of Congress, among others, that the union
would obey the antistrike law.
In September of 1980, a House subcommittee began hearings,
prompted by FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond's public charges
that PATCO planned to call a strike in the spring of 1981.11 The
FAA's witness gave evidence supporting that charge 74 and stressed
that the union primarily was seeking higher pay-for example, as
much as pilots earned (over $100,000).7 He added that the union
had advised its members that a strike could halt air transportation
76
and that the government would be helpless.

69
70

5 U.S.C. § 7105 (Supp. V 1981).
Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108, 1111-13 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 667 F.2d

316 (2d Cir. 1981).
71 Id. at 1109, 1111.
72 Id. at 1113.
73 September 1980 Hearings,supra note 65, at 1 (statement of Rep. James M. Hanley).
74 The FAA's first witness, Raymond J. Van Vuren, Director of Air Traffic, gave evidence of highly organized planning for a strike, including a strike "subsistence" fund, created on a national level by PATCO in May 1978. Id. at 3-5. The FAA had charged that
PATCO's establishment of that fund was an unfair labor practice, but the Federal Labor

Relations Authority ("FLRA") dismissed that charge, noting that the fund had not been
used. In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, Case No. 22-09583 (CO), described in Letter from Alexander T. Graham, FLRA Washington Regional Director, to Ed-

ward V. Curran (April 30, 1979), af'd by FLRA in Letter from FLRA to Edward V. Curran
(Jan. 25, 1980) (copies of both letters are on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). See JoNEs REPORT, supranote 7, at 5, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at
407. Van Vuren testified that "the primary goal [of the strike] is money." September 1980

Hearings,supra note 65, at 5. He quoted from a "recent" Seattle Center PATCO newsletter,
stating, inter alia: "'Our power stems from one, and only one, source. That is our ability to

withhold our services en masse, thereby halting the air transportation system of this country." Id.
75 See September 1980 Hearings, supra note 65, at 5 (statement of Raymond Van

Vuren, FAA). PATCO President Poli acknowledged that PATCO was seeking pay comparable to that of pilots. Id. at 22 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
76Id. at 5 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA).
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The FAA's witness also described the agency's countermeasures: 7 7 personal warnings (after a 1978 New York slow-down) that
future illegal actions would be subject to criminal prosecution, 8
contingency plans for running the air traffic system despite a
strike,7 1 and efforts through past and proposed expenditures s0 to
respond to grievances by modernizing equipment and reducing
overtime.8 1 According to the FAA's witness, an important step toward the union's goal was "ultimately getting out from under the
Civil Service system and working in a quasi-governmental corporation with a legal right to strike." 82
Robert Poli, PATCO's President, challenged this testimony
about strike plans and reaffirmed his statement "on two separate
occasions before the Congress that this organization is not going to
strike next year,"8 " that the strike fund would not be used when
strikes were illegal," and that the national would place any striking local in trusteeship.8 5 Nevertheless, Poli also gave contraindications. He observed that his elevation to the presidency reflected his
greater readiness to strike;86 he castigated the FAA's handling of
air traffic controllers and stated that he would seek legislation in
order to obtain higher pay and fringe benefits as well as reduced
working hours. 87 Replying to a question, he suggested that Con-

Id. at 5, 6, 10, 11 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA).
71 Id. at 6 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA).
71 Id. (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA). Later, presumably in part as a demonstration of its resolve to resist a strike, the FAA was to publish, and to request comments
on, its comprehensive Draft National Air Traffic Control Contingency Plan for Potential
Strikes and Other Job Action by Air Traffic Controllers. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,100 (1980).
O September 1980 Hearings,supra note 65, at 3-8 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren,
FAA).
81 Id. at 8 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA).
,8 Id. at 5 (statement of Raymond Van Vuren, FAA).
"Id. at 19 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
" Id. at 21-22 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
81 Id. at 20 (statement of Robert Poll, PATCO).
5, Id. at 15 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO). Poll had become president in 1980
after PATCO's executive board had accepted the resignation of his predecessor, John Leyden, but not Poll's resignation as vice president. See TIME MAGAZNE, Aug. 17, 1981, at 14,
18.
67 September 1980 Hearings,supra note 65, at 19 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
He maintained that the FAA had authority to discuss salaries as a basis for recommendations to Congress but lacked authority to discuss a separate pay structure outside the general compensation system. Id. at 22. Poll agreed with Van Vuren that salary and its
equivalents would be the main issue, id. at 23, and that reducing regular hours from 40, id.
at 25, and a return to the status quo ante in their retirement system (apparently a reference
to the early retirement and second career training program that is provided for at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3381-3385 (1976), but has been unfunded since 1979) would also be important, September 1980 Hearings, supra note 65, at 25.
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gress's greatest contribution to avoiding a crisis would be to lend a
sympathetic ear to PATCO's future proposals for better conditions
and equipment 88
For several reasons, the likelihood of a strike appeared to have
decreased with the election of President Reagan, whom PATCO
had endorsed. 9 First, although Drew Lewis, the President's appointee as Secretary of Transportation, during his confirmation
hearings had strongly opposed an illegal strike, Poli praised the
Secretary for having acknowledged strike rumors and having
agreed to look at the union's demands.90 Second, the President had
exempted air controllers from a federal hiring freeze.9 1 Finally, on
February 10, 1981, President Reagan met at the White House with
President Poli and other union leaders.2 During that "cordial"
meeting, the President had promised to solicit the opinion of Poli,
among others, on his forthcoming budget cuts.9 s
Shortly after, and perhaps because of, these sympathetic conversations, PATCO presented substantial demands to the FAA for
more money, fewer hours, better retirement benefits, and improved
cost of living adjustments.9 ' On February 3, 1981, Representative
Clay introduced a bill in the House that would have substantially
satisfied PATCO's demands.9 5 The proposed statute would have
broadened the controllers' right to bargain by making it coexten" September 1980 Hearings, supra note 65, at 24 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
Although disavowing any strike threat, another witness, Lawrence Cushing, President of the
National Association of Air Traffic Specialists Station, echoed Poli's criticism of the FAA's
labor management relations and condemned in particular its handling of people and its deliberately dilatory bargaining tactics. Id. at 29, 30 (statement of Lawrence Cushing). He did,
however, praise the FAA, under Mr. Bond, for automating the flight service system. Id. This
testimony showed plainly that other federal employees were watching PATCO's tactics and
the government's response, with a view to assessing the government's resolution as well as
the payoff from strikes, actual and threatened.
Incidentally, "air traffic control specialists/station" work in flight service stations rather
than towers or en-route centers. Flight service stations have no air traffic control functions,
that is, they do not separate aircraft from one another. Their primary mission is to provide
private pilots with weather briefings, suggested routes, indications of turbulence and icing,
and related information. They also assist lost or disoriented pilots and provide navigational
and other help to pilots in emergencies.
" See [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 894, at 8 (1981).
'0 See Aviation Daily, Feb. 13, 1981, at 229.
"I [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 898, at 5 (1981); see id. at 42 (text of
Office of Management and Budget memorandum concerning the federal hiring freeze).
,2 [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 900, at 11 (1981).
Id.
JoNEs REPORT, supra note 7, at 128-29, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 530-31.
"5 H.R. 1576, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See 127 CONG. REc. H349 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1981).
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sive with mandatory bargaining in the private sector and could
also have been construed as granting the controllers a right to
strike.98 The Clay bill therefore proposed, with respect to air traffic
97
controllers, a substantial departure from the 1978 Reform Act.
The Clay bill, which apparently had been drafted with
PATCO's help,9 8 was introduced shortly before the scheduled beginning of negotiations for a renewal of the PATCO-FAA agreement, which was to expire on March 15, 1981. 91 In the ensuing negotiations, PATCO quickly meshed its bargaining position with the
bill so that PATCO's crucial demands tracked the provisions of the

bill. 100
Those demands were so far above the level of government
compensation that a labor-management looseleaf service abandoned its customary blandness in describing them as reminiscent
of the model agreements that sometimes serve as the opening rite
of private sector bargaining. 11 The union's demands generated legal as well as financial problems. Under the 1978 Reform Act, the
FAA could not properly agree to such demands because they went
beyond the scope of bargaining provided by law. 10 2 Even the
formula adopted by the FAA in order to avoid the statutory limitations-that it could negotiate only over what provisions it would

" See H.R. 1576, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(a) (1981). This construction would have
been based on the bill's granting the controllers the right not only to "bargain collectively"
but also "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." Id. Cf. State v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont.
349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974) (construing a Montana provision similar to § 5(a) of H.R. 1576 as
granting public employees the right to strike); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, §§ 7, 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1976). At a hearing on April 30, 1981, Poli stated that
he did not interpret "concerted activities" as encompassing the right to strike but reaffirmed
his advocacy of that right. See Oversight on Grievances of Air Traffic Control Specialists:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as April 1981 Hearings].
' See supra note 67.
" See April 1981 Hearings, supra note 96, at 18; Aviation Daily, Feb. 5, 1981, at 177;
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 148, at AA3 (Aug. 3, 1981).

" [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 905, at 11 (1981).
100 Id.
101Id. at 12.
102 Secretary

Lewis listed "pay, any change in the present system of payment, retirement benefits, a change in annual and sick leave accruals, the 32-hour workweek, and
changes in health and life insurance benefits" as beyond the scope of bargaining. April 1981
Hearings,supra note 96, at 13. Although employees have the right to bargain collectively
with respect to "conditions of employment," 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2) (Supp. V 1981), any items
specifically governed by statute, as are those enumerated by Secretary Lewis, are not covered by "conditions of employment," id. § 7103(a)(14)(c).
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support for submission before the Congress 1 s -raised tensions
under the limiting statutory policy.10 4 Although the several purposes of the Clay bill are speculative, the bill never appeared to
have much potential for contributing to a strike-free settlement. 10 5
Indeed, some PATCO members apparently considered the bill to
have been still-born and a strike virtually inevitable.
That belief is reflected in a set of minutes of a meeting of the
Sacramento Valley Cluster, 0 ' held on April 30, 1981. The minutes,
which are set forth in the margin,1°0 are important, for they reflect
10I October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 42. Several committee members charged
that FAA Administrator Helms had himself "broke[n] the law" by bargaining over matters
reserved for Congress and that he had been a hypocrite by maintaining that the controllers'
violation of the law barred their reinstatement following their discharge. Id. at 36-40. But cf.
id. at 39-40. (Representative Wolf, suggesting Helms would have been damned if FAA had
not negotiated wages and now is being damned because he had). Helms explained that Representative Howard, Chairman of the Public Works Committee, had requested Helms and
Secretary Lewis to "get into it" despite Helms's emphasis on his lack of authority to negotiate wages. Id. at 41.
14 Such agreed-upon recommendations, even though explicitly subject to legislative approval (and rejection), would have placed enormous pressures on Congress to approve them
and would, if rejected, have fed strike fever and helped to make a strike morally more acceptable to the employees and the public. Furthermore, such agreed-upon recommendations
could have served as a basis for demands by other unions and groups. These considerations
suggest that such recommendations regarding nonmandatory items put pressure on both the
federal antistrike policy and the policy in favor of centralized determination of compensation. The situation facing the public sector "employer" is, accordingly, distinguishable from
that facing a party willing to go beyond "mandatory items" in private sector bargaining.
106 On the surface, the bill gave some legitimacy to a prohibitively expensive set of
PATCO bargaining demands. It may have whetted the appetite of some controllers for dramatic gains when such gains would have collided with the budget-cutting thrust of national
policy. On the other hand, controllers may have dismissed the bill as a gesture by a friend
on the Hill, with little effect, except perhaps to deepen their cynicism about the legislative
process-their substitute for a strike under existing law. They could, of course, point to the
bill and claim that they had asked Congress to discharge its responsibility and that Congress's inaction left them no alternative but to strike. Furthermore, because the bill could
have been construed as exempting controllers from the strike ban, see supra note 96 and
accompanying text, the bill may have helped to undermine the foundation of that ban at a
time when the ban could not be repealed but might be nullified, "in the streets."
10 A "cluster" consisted of a group of air traffic controllers in a particular region, constituted solely for strike purposes. The entire country had been broken down into regions,
each with its own cluster. The cluster regions were wholly strike-oriented and independent
of the structure of both the FAA and PATCO. The clusters' leaders were known as "choir
boys." We have been advised by a former air traffic controller that communication among
clusters throughout the country was excellent.
1'7 These minutes, we have been advised, were produced in the course of discovery in
the action between the Air Transport Association ("ATA") and PATCO, which led to the
opinion in Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 667 F.2d 316
(2d Cir. 1981). The minutes first fix the location of the cluster's strike hall, and then read, in
part, as follows:
NEGOTIATIONS UPDATE
The negotiations broke off on April 28. Two (2) polarized positions exist and there is
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the attitudes of the participants and present such a sharp contrast
to the no-strike pledge given by Mr. Poli to a congressional committee on the same day. 10 8 The obvious conclusion is that the Sacramento cluster (as well as PATCO) was indeed interested in striking, that the participants were aware of statutory limitations on
the FAA's bargaining authority, and that, perhaps because of past
practices by the executive branch, the participants were unaware
of, or unconcerned with, potential sanctions against strikes.
As already indicated, on April 30, 1981, the day of the Sacramento Valley Cluster meeting, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service held hearings on the air
controllers matter. These hearings in part confirmed the Sacramento minutes by highlighting the large financial spread between
the government and PATCO. 109 President Poll's testimony once
again seemed both to disclaim any strike plans and to hint at the
possibility of a strike." 0

no possibility of resolving items through negotiations. On one hand, PATCO has made
its demands, and can't withdraw. FAA is boxed in by law, and can't negotiate. Salary
demands, work hours and retirement benefits are restricted by law.
LEGISLATION
Subcommittee hearing due to start April 30. There is a very slim possibility legislation
will pass the Reagan-controlled Congress, especially in light of Reagan's economic policies. There is a slim chance to get it passed through the House. Chances in Republican
Senate almost impossible. Even if legislation were to pass it would take 12-18 months
to pass. No way PATCO membership will wait that long. We must give them cause to
pass this legislation.
Congress can move in an emergency situation. In 1970, when the postal workers
went out on strike, Congress passed legislation in 3 days. Probably the only way we
will get anything is "in the streets."
Minutes of Sacramento Valley Cluster Meeting 1 (Apr. 30, 1981) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) (emphasis added). The rest of the minutes was concerned with
PATCO's plans for achieving its demands "in the streets."
103 See April 1981 Hearings,supra note 96, at 17 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
" Secretary Lewis estimated that PATCO's proposals would cost $1.1 billion in the
first year; President Poll estimated a total of $1.7 billion for three years. Id. at 8 (statement
of Drew Lewis, Department of Transportation ("DOT")), 24 (statement of Robert Poli,
PATCO). Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") expressed the Reagan Administration's opposition, "'as a matter of principle,"' to the pay proposals, urging
consideration of them as part of the Administration's overall pay reform proposal, H.R.
3140. Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Oskar quoting letter from OMB to House Committee).
1 Poli stated: "I will say again, we are not planning a strike, but I will say.., there is
a certain unrest among the membership of our organization." Id. at 17 (statement of Robert
Poli, PATCO). Rank-and-file controllers in the audience strengthened those intimations by
indicating that a strike was a serious possibility. See [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 911, at 13-14 (1981). Earlier, at about the time bargaining with the FAA began,
Poll acknowledged in an interview that strikes against the federal government were prohibited but claimed "'the only illegal strike is an unsuccessful one."' Aviation Daily, Feb. 5,
1981, at 177 (quoting R. Poli).
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From late in April until the strike in August of 1981, negotiations were accompanied by developments that alternately raised
and lowered strike fears. On the basis of the evidence we have examined, we cannot be certain whether any of the actions ostensibly
directed at achieving a strike-free settlement were, in fact, part of
a charade disguising different purposes: for PATCO, the nullification of the strike ban or of the restrictive federal framework for
bargaining; for the government, the goading of PATCO into a selfdestructive strike. The last charge, made by PATCO after the
strike,11 1 does not, however, appear to have any evidentiary support. The Administration seemed to be turning square corners as
the negotiations reached their climax and denouement.
PATCO, by contrast, lurched from the confrontational to the
conciliatory and back. It is not clear whether these shifts reflected
tactical posturings by the leadership or the difficulties the leadership faced in seeking to maintain a steady course when many of its
constituents were so deeply discontented that they were willing to
strike even in defiance of the law. Nevertheless, the last chapter of
the negotiations in the spring and summer of 1981 suggests that
PATCO's leadership was bent on striking unless the government
substantially met its demands. On April 28, 1981, after approximately thirty-seven bargaining sessions, some assisted by federal
mediators, PATCO and the FAA suspended negotiations." 2 A chorus of strike threats followed. At the union's convention May 2225,113 its executive board disclosed that it had fixed June 22 as the
date for "possible" strike action. 1
These events prompted the FAA to instruct supervisors to remind each controller that a strike would violate federal law.11 5 The
union countered by confirming June 21 as the deadline for beginning strike preparations, noting that it too had advised its members that a strike would be illegal and that PATCO itself, contrary
111October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 182.
,12 [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 916, at 7 (1981); see [Jan.-June] Gov't
Empl. ReL. Rep. (BNA) No. 915, at 18 (1981).
113 [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 916, at 7 (1981).
1"
[Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 915, at 18 (1981). The membership,
although not formally endorsing a June 22 deadline, enthusiastically supported the execu-

tive board's report. Id. Poll is quoted as having told the convention, "'If they [FAA] do not
come to their senses, I vow to you that the skies will be silent.. . . By midnight of June 21,
if we have not received something to present to the members, I will order the countdown to
begin immediately."' Id. (quoting R. Poli). Poll had previously advised an FAA representa-

tive of his intention to announce a strike date. October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 17778.
115 [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 916, at 7 (1981).
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to Helms's charge, would not seek to evade any responsibility.1 1 6
Helms sent a personal letter to each controller's home, describing
the "ramifications" of a strike. 117 Although these warnings built a
record, they scarcely reduced strike fears, which heightened during
June. Travelers, shippers, and railroads changed plans and prepared for a strike.11 8 The instability produced by the overhanging
threat itself undercut one of the purposes behind the antistrike
policy-maintaining public confidence that vital services would not
be interrupted. And the instability could in turn be traced, at least
in- part, to past executive leniency with respect to "job actions" by
the air traffic controllers.
Early in June, the suspended negotiations resumed but soon
collapsed after PATCO rejected an FAA offer. 9 A last minute settlement was, however, reached on June 22, at 5:30 A.M., ninety
minutes before the strike deadline.1 20 In the face of that settlement, both sides took steps ostensibly aimed at supporting the
newly reached agreement and averting a strike. President Pol endorsed the agreement and announced that he would recommend 21
and work for1 22 ratification by PATCO's members. The White
House, presumably seeking to encourage ratification, endorsed the
agreement and threatened reprisal against a strike.1 2
Poli's acceptance of the settlement may have been prompted
by the outcome of a telephone poll, which showed that seventy-five
percent of the members supported a strike, less than the eighty
percent an earlier resolution had prescribed for a strike call. 24
116 Id.
x1' October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 60. Helms indicated that the controllers
might have been confused by the union's advice-even though they had been warned by the
government "numerous times" in advance. Id. at 61-63. Whatever the source of the confusion, a small and thoroughly unscientific sampling (by these authors) of controllers, strikers
and nonstrikers, and union officials close to the scene indicated that the strikers had believed that they would be back at work in several days.
128 [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 944, at 5-6 (1982).
"I [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 918, at 10 (1981).
120 Id. at 9. The Department of Transportation estimated the benefits involved would
cost $40.3 million during the first year of a 33 year agreement. Id. Poli in general terms
disputed that estimate. October 1981 Hearings,supra note 5, at 178. In any event, the package was far slimmer than the union's opening demand. See supra note 109.
1I
[Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 918, at 9 (1981).
122 See October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 66.
123 Deputy White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes referred to the "'generous wage
offer,"' described the legal arsenal that the Reagan Administration would use against strikers, and warned that the President will "not 'tolerate an illegal strike."' [Jan.-June] Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 918, at 11 (1981) (quoting L. Speakes).
124 [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 920, at 16 (1981). Poli later explained
that he accepted the settlement because Lewis assured him that if he did there would be no

1983]

Public Employee Strikes

Rank-and-file opposition soon surfaced, however, and the settlement crumbled. On July 2, the nine members of PATCO's executive board, which included President Poli, who abstained,125 unanimously resolved to ask that the members "overwhelmingly reject"
the settlement.1 28 This resolution was announced to a cheering,
strike-chanting meeting of some 500 local leaders. There, Poli himself received a standing ovation, after being "forgiven" by the
board for his prior endorsement of the package, in view of the surrounding circumstances.2 This resolution complained generally
that the proposed settlemeni "does not address

. . .

fundamental

issues." 128 But the two important missing elements appeared to
have been a reduction in the work week and a separate higher pay
schedule. 129 In the ratification vote, 13,495-95.3%-voted against

the settlement.130
After the failure of ratification, fifty-five Senators and fifteen
Representatives sought to avert the approaching work stoppage. In
similar letters sent to the FAA for countrywide distribution to controllers, they described the rejected settlement as fair, reminded
the controllers of the sanctions against strikes by federal employees, promised to encourage the President to "use the full force of
the law," and warned that Congress would not be "receptive to any
demands negotiated by force."131 At a press conference on July 31,
however, Poli rejected the proposal and warned that there would
be an immediate strike vote for authorization of a strike to begin
at 12:01 A.M. on Monday, August 3, unless a settlement was
reached.3 2 Shortly thereafter, PATCO rejected the government's
action taken against wildcat strikers. See October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 179
(statement of Robert Poli, PATCO). The accuracy of a report of the later strike vote was
not free from doubt. See infra note 132.
"' October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 179 (statement of Robert Poli, PATCO).
11 [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 920, at 16 (1981).
127 Id.
118 Id.
129 Id.
10 [July-Dec.]

Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 923, at 5 (1981). Poll, after noting but
not explicitly denying charges that he had encouraged a no vote, made this somewhat hazy
statement: "The vote of the membership of this organization was 95 percent of the members
rejecting that contract. I don't think that Bob Poll had to go around the country and preach
to the members to reject it. That is the story of what happened on June 22." October 1981
Hearings, supra note 5, at 179.
Soon after this rejection, Representative Clay introduced H.R. 4332, which was essentially the same as H.R. 1576, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text, except for the
deletion of both the two top grades of pay and the language implying a right to strike. See
H.R. 4332, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 127 CONG. Rzc. H5430 (daily ed. July 30, 1981).
1 [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 923, at 6 (1981).
12 Id. at 5. Poli, in reply to a question from Representative Derwinski, testified that he
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request that negotiations continue for a week"' and allowed only

three days to work out a substitute
for an agreement whose devel13 4
opment had taken six months.
A substitute agreement did not emerge during the three days
stipulated by PATCO. And so at dawn on August 3, 1981, the
strike began, with approximately 13,000
of the 16,400 controllers in
135
the bargaining unit participating.

C. The Immediate Responses to the Strike
On the same day, President Reagan, reminding the strikers of
their oaths, gave them forty-eight hours-until August 5, 11:00
A..-in which to return to work or be discharged. 36s Approxi-

37
mately 1200 controllers returned to work after that warning.1
To deal with recalcitrants, the government quickly activated a
formidable set of weapons against PATCO, its officers, and individual controllers. In a short period beginning on August 3, the
Department of Justice filed actions for temporary restraining orders or injunctions in sixty federal courts. 38 The Justice Department obtained civil and criminal contempt citations, and it
threatened criminal prosecutions.
Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis announced on August
5 that "'the strike is over' "'" and began to send dismissal letters.140 These steps, together with the President's ultimatum of
August 3, transformed the legal situation. Having declared the
strike ended and, what was more important, having discharged the
strikers, the government itself prevented individual controllers

had no documentation of the strike votes of June 22 and August 3, but that if the compilations that had been made were still available, he would provide them. See October 1981
Hearings,supra note 5, at 181. Poll did not provide any compilations for Representative
Derwinski. Letter from Joseph A. Fisher, Minority Staff Director for the House Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, to Roy B. Underhill (Aug. 19, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Letters by these authors to PATCO concerning the compilations have gone unanswered.
1" October 1981 Hearings,supra note 5, at 63-64 (statement of J. Lynn Helms, FAA).
134

Id. at 66 (news release by Sec. Lewis).

135[July-Dec.] Gov't Empl.Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 924, at 5 (1981).
136 President's Statement Concerning Air Traffic Controllers Strike, 17 WEEKLY Compu.
PREs. Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981).
M See PATCO v. United States Dep't of Transp., 529 F. Supp. 614, 615 (D. Minn.
1982).

I See PATCO v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 551 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1982); United States v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.2 (D.D.C. 1981).
'39United

States v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D.D.C. 1981) (quoting Sec. Lewis).
2" See [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 924, at 46 (1981), for a sample
letter.
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from going back to work in accordance with court decrees. Consequently, in imposing sanctions for civil or criminal contempt,
courts could properly use August 5, the date of Secretary Lewis's
announcement, as the time when legally significant defiance of the
prior injunctions against the strikes ended.141
The Department of Transportation ("DOT") also adopted a
strict position. It rejected fact finding, mediation, or bargaining
with PATCO so long as President Poli did not give a back-to-work
order. 142 In addition, the Department petitioned for, and ultimately secured, PATCO's decertification as the controllers' barUnited States v. PATCO, 524 F. Supp. 160, 164-65 (D.D.C. 1981).
Even though PATCO and other contemnors could no longer engage in a practically
significant compliance with the back-to-work order, their conduct might have violated other
provisions of the temporary restraining order. The court, although acknowledging this point,
declined to impose fines for "collateral activities," such as picketing, after finding that they
had not substantially interfered with air traffic or with controllers wishing to go back to
work. Id. at 164 n.5. The court did not mention, however, that for some time after the
Secretary's announcement, strike related activities continued and that PATCO-which had
started the strike-had not declared it ended. See, e.g., R. Poll, Presidential Update (Sept.
25, 1981) (addressed to "Brothers and Sisters," id. at 1, providing a status report, and stating "[a]s the strike continues," id. at 4) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); see also R. Poll, Presidential Update (Oct. 8, 1981) (addressed to "Dear Brothers and
Sisters" and stating "I cannot tell you that the strike will end soon . . . ." Id. at 1) (on file
with The University of Chicago Law Review). Nor did the court consider whether an unequivocal announcement by PATCO ending the strike might have brought full air control
service closer by leading to a resumption of fruitful negotiations, the return of controllers
eligible for reinstatement, or some form of amnesty for the others. Cf. Adams v. Smith, No.
NY075281F0424, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., N.Y. Reg. Off. Oct. 14,
1982), upholding discharge of controllers who would have been allowed to return to work
had they exercised their option to do so sometime after August 6 and noting that neither
the union's going out of existence nor its abandonment of the strike (presumably before the
expiration of the option) had been shown. The Department of Justice apparently did not
invite the court to explore such labor-relations considerations. The Department instead conceded that its request for a preliminary injunction was concerned primarily with matters
collateral to the ending of the strike-interference by picketing after August 5, and possible
dissipation of the "Controllers Benefit Fund." (See infra note 157 for discussion of this
fund.) The court denied any relief, for lack of proof of irreparable injury. United States v.
PATCO, 524 F. Supp. at 162-63. In the end, the court, principally on the basis of its reasoning about the ending of the strike, limited PATCO's civil-contempt fine to $750,000 and
Poli's to $2000-for violating the temporary restraining order for two days, ending on August 5. Id. at 165. Essentially the same reasoning was adopted in United States v. PATCO
Local 504, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3196 (10th Cir. 1983), vacating fines imposed for civil
contempt.
The varying results of requests for injunctions against picketing in other courts are
summarized in [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 925, at 11 (1981).
142 [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 924, at 5 (1981). The Administration
was not required to bargain, even within the sphere of mandatory bargaining, while PATCO
was engaged in an illegal strike. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2)(B)(v) (Supp. V 1981) (excluding
from the definition of "employee" any striker); 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(D) (Supp. V 1981)
(excluding from the definition of "labor organization" an organization that participates in a
strike).
141
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gaining representative.14 3
There was widespread public support for the Administration's
unyielding position. 4 4 Two elements seem to have been crucial for
that support. First, the strike appeared to lack much moral content. The salaries and working conditions of the strikers scarcely
generated sympathy among a public conscious of high levels of inflation and unemployment. Moreover, the strikers had not only defied the law but also, as constantly emphasized by the Administration, had broken their oath; they had done so after Poli's approval
of a proposed agreement undercut their claim that their basic goal
had not been money but the safety of the system and elimination
of working conditions destructive of safety and the health of the
controllers. Finally, the strike had directly challenged a President,
who, having survived assassination, was at the peak of his popularity, which had been achieved in part because of his campaign
45
against government spending.
143 PATCO v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1981). On
August 3, 1981, in response to an FAA charge filed that day, the FLRA Regional Director
issued a complaint against PATCO, alleging strike activity prohibited by 5 U.S.C. §
7116(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981) and seeking revocation of PATCO's certification under the 1978
Reform Act. PATCO v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d at 552. See id. for a detailed description of the procedure involved. Furthermore, the opinion describes the differences reflected in the three opinions by the FLRA members, issued on October 22, 1981,
with respect to the extent of the FLRA's discretion to withhold decertification of a union in
wilful violation of the strike prohibition. Id. at 554-55. Chairman Haughton's conditional
dissent apparently invited, without success, PATCO to retreat.
"I On October 6, the FAA Administrator claimed that his mail was running 1000 to 1
in support of the Administration's handling of the strike. October 1981 Hearings, supra
note 5, at 59 (statement of J. Lynn Helms, FAA). Furthermore, a Gallup poll, taken shortly
after the strike began and published in Newsweek, found that 57% approved of President
Reagan's handling of the strike, and 67% thought the strike was wrong. A Newsweek Poll:
Support for the President,NEwSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1981, at 21. A Harris poll published in the
New York Times found that 51% opposed the strike while 69% thought President Reagan
had a right to fire the strikers. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1981, at A18, col. 6.
Editorials in the major newspapers were strongly antistrike. The Washington Post
characterized the strike as a "wildly misconceived venture that deserves the government's
extraordinarily severe response." Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1981, at A14, col. 1. The New
York Times referred to the strike as an attempted "holdup." N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at
A14, col. 1. Editorials in The Wall Street Journal and the Chicago Tribune also disapproved of the strike. Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1981, § 1, at 22, col. 1; Chicago Trib., Aug. 5, 1981, §
1, at 22, col. 1. An unscientific sampling of newspapers across the country showed overwhelming support for the Administration's position. See 12 EDrrORIAS ON FILE 886, 886-95

(1981).

Not all newspapers that endorsed the initial discharge of the strikers agreed with President Reagan's continuing hard-line stance against rehiring any of the strikers. Id.
I" Poli himself offered some of these reasons in his "post-mortem" of the strike. See
Poli, A PATCO Post-Mortem: Why the Controllers' Strike Failed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1982, at F3, col. 2.
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The second factor behind public support for the Administration was its capacity to keep the planes flying. Under the DOT's
contingency plans, supervisors, military controllers, and nonstriking controllers assumed the responsibilities of the strikers. Traffic
was, of course, substantially reduced, but the national average of
arrivals and departures approached seventy-five to eighty percent
of prestrike levels by October 1981.14e Although PATCO and
others, here and abroad, 147 raised questions about safety, the FAA
had taken extra precautions to decrease the risk of accidents.14 8 A

prudent concern for safety called for caution during the adjustment to a new operational situation; political considerations
pointed in the same direction. An accident attributable to air controller error, regardless of its true cause, not only would have involved substantial political costs but also would have put pressure
on the Administration to soften its opposition to the reinstatement
of the strikers. No such accident occurred.
It was this combination of moral appeal and operational effectiveness that contributed to the Administration's quick success. As
we have seen, the initial reactions of influential newspapers to the
Administration's position was, on the whole, positive. 149 To be

sure, representatives of organized labor, both here'50 and abroad,' 5 '

146 The impact on particularly busy airports, such as O'Hare (Chicago), was much more
severe. Furthermore, carriers tended to concentrate reductions on smaller equipment, hence
the number of passengers was reduced less than the number of departures. Finally, a precise
quantification of strike effects was complicated by the changes in service patterns attributable to deregulation. See Memorandum from Office of Economic Analysis to Civil Aeronautics Board, The Impact of the PATCO Job Action: August through October (Feb. 5, 1982),
reprinted in Status of and Future Plansfor the FAA's Air Traffic Control System (pt. 2):
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. of Gov't Activities and Transportationof the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings];
Memorandum from Office of Economic Analysis to Civil Aeronautics Board, The Impact of
the PATCO Job Action: November through March (July 16, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
147 See October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 131, 134, 162-63, 174, 206; PATCO's
Spotty Aid Abroad, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1981, at 86; N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1981, at A22, col.
1.
1*4 See Status of and Future Plans for the FAA's Air Traffic Control System (pt. 1):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Activities and Transportation of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981) (statement of J. Lynn Helms,
FAA) [hereinafter cited as September 1981 Hearings]. The National Transportation Safety
Board, while agreeing that the strike had not led to unsafe conditions, emphasized that the
stress and fatigue of the curtailed work force could eventually become a hazard. See NA-

TIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: AIR TRAFFIC CON-

TROL SYSTEM 32-33 (Dec. 8, 1981), reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 147, 180-

81.
'49 See supra note 144.
150 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 151, at AA-3 (Aug. 6, 1981); [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 924, at 12 (1981).
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reacted negatively. But their opposition seemed essentially ritualistic, except for some short-lived interference by controllers in other
countries. 152 By October, PATCO appeared to lack leverage that it
could exert directly to save its members' jobs or its own existence
as an organization.15
D.

The Strike: Looking Backwards

PATCO and many of its members had obviously miscalculated
when they had gambled that their power would force the Administration to capitulate to some or all of the union's demands. We
propose to explore the elements that entered into PATCO's miscalculation. Such an exploration may yield more general lessons
about public administration and policy while cautioning against
extravagant inferences from this melancholy business.
1. The UnanticipatedNature of the Government's Response.
PATCO apparently counted on a continuation of the government's
prior unwillingness to enforce the antistrike law vigorously. These
expectations had a somewhat plausible basis. As we have seen,
prior job actions, including those by the controllers, had not resulted in massive discharges and replacements. 1 54 The leniency of
the past may have reflected a fear of the controllers' capacity to
cripple air transportation. The previous calculus had been transformed, however, by a cluster of factors: the government's strike
plans; overmanning of the air control system, both among rankand-file and supervisors; and the availability of military personnel
as replacements.1 55 In addition, the new administration looked to
151 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 235, at A-3 (Dec. 8, 1981) (Soviet delegate to Freedom
of Association Commission of the International Labor Organization assailed the U.S. government's "repression" of the strikers); see N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
'" See PATCO's Spotty Aid Abroad, supra note 147, at 86.
Poststrike proponents of compassion toward the discharged controllers relied on past
governmental leniency as evidence"of the government's lack of "clean hands." For example,
Representative Ford suggested that the Administration was being inconsistent with past
practice, which had suggested that an air controller "could demonstrate his unhappiness for
a reasonable period." October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 59. He immediately disclaimed any suggestion that striking against the government was not a serious offense. Id.
113 PATCO also had problems with money. Faced with $150 million in fines, PATCO
filed for reorganization on Nov. 25, 1981. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1981, at A20, col. 1. On July
2, 1982, $40 million dollars in debt, PATCO filed for bankruptcy. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1982,
at 7, col. 1.
'" See Comment, supra note 7.
155 For a summary of this shift as described by Langhorne M. Bond, FAA Administrator under President Carter, see Francke, FAA's Finest Hour. . ., J. ATC, Jan.-Mar. 1982,
reprintedin 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 386. For a thorough discussion of the use of
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new constituencies and reflected changes in the national mood that
worked against the continuation of past leniency towards or "appeasement" of those who had broken the antistrike oath and the
law. The unsuccessful response of the Carter Administration to the
dreadful dilemma of the Iranian hostages invited strong action
against lawbreakers, for both domestic and international reasons.
Finally, the issues raised by an unlawful strike against the federal
government and by a violation of the federal oath of office were
well suited to the communication skills of President Reagan.
PATCO's leaders and its members appear, both before and
immediately after the strike, to have been oblivious to such considerations. Certainly, some of their rhetoric must be discounted as
the posturing that precedes strikes. But the strike itself and subsequent conversations with controllers suggest that PATCO and its
supporters believed their own confident statements that a strike
would cripple the system and inflict incalculable damage on the
economy.' 5 6 PATCO appears to have realized before the strike that
some of its striking members might forfeit their jobs, but PATCO
also appears to have counted on their indispensability, which
would force the government to grant amnesty to almost all strikers.
For the few who might sacrifice their jobs, PATCO sought to establish extraordinary protection through a fund designed to replace income lost by discharged air controllers. 157 The anticipated
governmental leniency toward most strikers, combined with
PATCO's promised economic safety net for the others, naturally
tended to undercut one of the deterrents to striking in 1981.
military forces to replace striking public employees, see Jacobs, The Role of Military Forces

in Public Sector Labor Relations, 35 INDus. & LAB. REL. Rv.163 (1982).
I" See April 1981 Hearings,supra note 96, at 14 (statement of Robert Poll, PATCO);
[Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 911, at 13 (1981); JoNEs REPORT, supra note
7, at 9, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 411; Magnuson, Turbulence in the
Tower, Tm, Aug. 17, 1981, at 14, 20 (quoting a Houston controller as saying: "'Where are
they going to get 13,000 controllers and train them before the economy sinks? The reality is,
we are it. They have to deal with us.' "); Chicago Trib., Aug. 20, 1981, § 1, at 15, col. 4
(column by former PATCO local president suggesting PATCO expected leniency from the
government, on the basis of PATCO's success in the 1970 sick-out); [July-Dec.] Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 928, at 7 (1981) (Poll acknowledges that the strike "'is taking us
longer than we thought'" but claims that the aviation industry "'needs us desperately' ").
157 See supra note 74. PATCO,a corporation, filed for bankruptcy on July 2, 1982. In
the bankruptcy proceedings, this fund was held to be available for PATCO's creditors. See
In re PATCO, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2156 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982). Dismissing several technical
difficulties, the court found the benefit fund to be an express trust but concluded that its
purpose, to provide benefits to participants in an illegal strike, was repugnant to public
policy and could not properly be effectuated. Similarly, considerations of public policy, as
well as the clean hands doctrine, required that the fund remain as a union asset instead of
being returned to the members whose dues had created the fund.
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2. Pre-election Conduct of the President.The conduct of candidate Ronald Reagan and his staff might also have contributed to
PATCO's willingness to strike. In connection with a successful bid
for PATCO's support in the 1980 election, Governor Reagan, in a
highly publicized letter dated October 20, 1980,158 referred to the
deplorable state of the nation's air traffic control system and noted
that he had been "thoroughly briefed" by his staff that "too few
people working unreasonable hours with obsolete equipment [has]
placed the nation's air travellers in unwarranted danger." He
pledged that "my administration will work very closely with you to
bring about a spirit of cooperation between the President and the
air traffic controllers," and promised remedial action. 159 Realists
could dismiss all this as campaign oratory, but not without some
additional denigration of the political process, on which federal
employees are especially dependent-in the absence of a right to
strike. It would not have been implausible for some controllers to
have read into Reagan's generalities a promise of a quid pro quo
when and if he became President. The controllers may have expected to reap extraordinary rewards without a strike for having
broken ranks with most of organized labor and supported candidate Reagan.
In any event, some of those negotiating with PATCO have privately described its unusual unresponsiveness to claims that the
government's "bag was empty," and have ascribed that attitude to
the union leaders' belief that the President would somehow redeem
his campaign pledge. 160 Perhaps, alternatively, PATCO's leaders
expected that if they did strike, the Reagan Administration would
help protect the jobs of the strikers and the representative status
of their union or, at a minimum, that the President himself would
stay above the battle-possibly conciliating, but not becoming
This letter appeared as part of an advertisement in the New York Times. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1981, at 69, col. 1.
1"

159 Id.

160 Supporting this belief may have been a letter from Richard Leighton, PATCO's general counsel, to Michael Balzano, labor contact for candidate Reagan, setting forth Leighton's understanding of agreements reached with the Reagan campaign organization. See
Letter from Richard J. Leighton to Michael Balzano, Ph.D. (Oct. 20, 1980). That letter
stated that if elected, Reagan would give PATCO a voice in the choice of a new FAA Administrator and allow PATCO a "reasonable opportunity" to persuade the Reagan Administration to support any future legislation concerning the air controllers, including legislation

giving PATCO bargaining rights like those of the postal workers and a limited right to
strike. See Aviation Daily, June 23, 1981, backs of pp. 290-92. Both Balzano and Leighton
later tried to minimize the significance of that letter. See Aviation Daily, July 1, 1981, at 12. Leighton even wrote a letter in the form of a brief to Attorney General William F. Smith,
disclaiming any law-breaking. See Aviation Daily, July 6, 1981, backs of pp. 18-23.
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their most effective adversary. Finally, by agreeing that PATCO's
primary goal was not money but the promotion of public safety
and humane working conditions, candidate Reagan conceivably
may have helped persuade some controllers of the moral justification for an illegal strike."'
3. The Role of Representative Clay. Representative Clay may
also have helped raise strike fever. At PATCO's 1980 National
Convention, according to a newsletter distributed in 1980 to
PATCO members, Clay provided guidelines for ruthless selfseeking:
"Your plan must be one which completely revises your political thinking. It should start with the premise that you have no
permanent friends, no permanent enemies, just permanent interests. It must be selfish and pragmatic. You must learn the
rules of the game and learn them well:
"Rule No. 1 says that you don't put the interest of any
other group ahead of your own. What's good for federal employees must be interpreted as'being good for the Nation.
"Rule No. 2 says that you take what you can, give up
only what you must.
"Rule No. 3 says that you take it from whomever you
can, whenever you can, however you can .... If you are not
prepared to play by the rules then you have not reached the
age of political maturity and perhaps you deserve everything
that's happening to you. .. .
4. Job-related Grievances. Finally, good faith dissatisfaction
with salaries and working conditions was an important factor in
the ultimate strike decision. Indeed, it is doubtful that thousands
of controllers, without a genuine sense of grievance, would have

161 It is true that by the middle of June the President's staff had disavowed any preelection deal, see Aviation Daily, July 1, 1981, at 1, and that the President and his men, as
the strike came closer, gave clear notice to the strikers of the Administration's ultimate
response. By then, however, the union leadership may have been insensitive to such signs,
for strike momentum was so strong that the leadership could abort a strike without loss of
face and power only by reporting significant government concessions.
I'l PATCO Local 301, Chicago Center, PATCO News 8 (1980) (quoting Representative
Clay (emphasis added)) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Mr. Clifton
von Kaan, President, National Aeronautic Association, referred to that advice in his testimony on April 30, 1981, before the Subcommittee on Compensation. See April 1981 Hearings, supra note 96, at 39. Von Kaan added: "Now the PATCO President has told the Congress in carefully chosen words that unless the controllers have their way they will wreak
more havoc on the public and the air transport system because the only illegal strike is an
unsuccessful one." Id.
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broken their oaths and taken the risks posed by striking.1 3 The
controllers were, after all, paid well relative both to other government personnel and to the general public. Many of them had had
military service and viewed themselves as patriotic Americans.
They had supported a candidate whose rhetoric reflected the values of patriotism and of the middle classes, into which they
seemed comfortably to fit. They did not seem to be the stuff out of
which wholesale civil disobedience came without some sense of
grievance that apparently lent some moral justification to their
conduct. True, moral indignation may have been in part a cover for
a pervasive human desire to obtain more pay for less work."' But
the events objectively viewed and our discussions with air controllers suggest to us that the sense of dissatisfaction was deep and
genuine, whether or not it was justified. Furthermore, there was
some basis for dissatisfaction-which should not, however, be confused with justification for the strike. Indeed, for more than a decade, various task forces have expressed concern over justifiable disaffection among the air controllers and unsatisfactory relationships
1 65
between labor organizations and the FAA management.
143 See JONES REPORT, supra note 7, at 1, 10-11, 18-20, 38, 39, reprinted in 1981-82
Hearings, supra note 5, at 403, 412-13, 420-22, 440, 441 (noting that controllers, strikers as
well as nonstrikers, enjoy their work but nonetheless have a negative attitude toward their
job).
A recurring debate between PATCO and the FAA has concerned the stress involved in
the controllers' work and the resulting incidence of "burnout." PATCO has maintained that
controlling air traffic is uniquely stressful, and that claim has been the backbone of its arguments for special treatment. See April 1981 Hearing,supra note 96, at 15-16, 17-18. Studies
on this issue, although finding some significant differences between the health of air controllers and that of the general population, do not provide strong support for PATCO's claim.
See Staten & Umbeck, Information Costs and Incentives to Shirk: Disability Compensation of Air Traffic Controllers, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1023 (1982); R. Rose, C. Jenkins, & M.
Hurst, Air Traffic Controller Health Change Study (1978) (FAA Office of Aviation Medicine
Report No. AM-78-39) [hereinafter cited as Rose Report]; R. Smith, Stress, Anxiety, and
the Air Traffic Control Specialist (1980) (FAA Office of Aviation Medicine Report No. AM80-14).
14 The Jones report concluded: "PATCO ... usurped the 'concern for people' role and
considered itself sufficiently powerful to conduct an illegal strike on August 3, 1981." JONES
REPORT, supra note 7, at 1, reprintedin 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 403. That report
also indicated that managers, sharing the controllers' desires for congressional authorization
of better equipment and more staff, had "not so subtly encouraged" prior job actions and
the concessions won. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 410.
"I See, e.g., AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER CAREER COMMITrEE REPORT (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CORSON REPORT], reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 545.
Although that report noted that the job demands made on controllers are present in
some other jobs, it concluded that controllers' work is distinctive in the "concentration and
intensity of such demands." Id. at 11, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 571.
See JONES REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at
407-08.
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The Jones Report is the latest and most completely documented statement pointing to managerial deficiencies as a factor in
the 1981 strike. Although methodological questions might be raised
about that report,'6 6 it has, for several reasons, an immediate significance that is independent of such questions. First, it appears to
be the umpire's call in a highly charged and complex controversy.
Since the umpires were picked by the government, one would
scarcely expect them to call the "close ones" against the government. Their criticisms of management thus tend to have considerable force. Second, the Jones Report echoes, and is reinforced by,
earlier criticisms of labor-management relations. 167 Third, the report has been circulated among the working controllers. Its conclusions regarding autocratic and insensitive management are likely to
become an important background for future employee relations
and for appraisals of the system's safety and the need for reinstating some of the fired strikers. Finally, the report is likely to be-

The Corson Committee had been appointed by Secretary of Transportation Volpe, in
response, inter alia, to the threatened breakdown of essential service attending "job actions"
in 1968 and 1969. See CORSON REPORT, supra, at 2-3, 106-07, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 562-63, 666-67. Its charge was a broad one, and it considered not only pay
and "burnout," but also tension and conflict between controllers and management. Id. at 23, 8-9, 25, 97-109, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 562-63, 568-69, 585, 65769. In short, as stated in the Jones Report, "the [1981] confrontation ... had been brewing
for many years" during which the dissatisfactions of both controllers and managers not only
fed on each other but also were exacerbated by the adversarial atmosphere created by
PATCO's prior job actions and by its harassment of dissident controllers as well as uncooperative managers. JONES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-11, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 411-13. That report also warned that if the 1981 strike is not to be repeated, the FAA "will have to drastically change its management style." Id. at 42, reprinted
in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 444.
"' For example, although the response to the questionnaire was only 48%, the standard requirement of a follow-up was not carried out. (The possibility of a sampling error
seems to have been substantially reduced, however, for a comparison of the sample and FAA
data indicated that the sample had the same demographic characteristics as the prestrike
controller work force. See JONES REPORT, supra note 7, at 14-16, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 416-18.) Furthermore, a survey conducted soon after a strike where
strikers have been replaced may be particularly susceptible to distortion, because of great
stress for some controllers and a sense of special accomplishment on the part of others.
Finally, the report's criticisms of employee-management relationships might also be discounted on the ground that such criticisms are practically standard in any study of bureaucratic structure. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIc ADMINISTRATION, EvALUATION OF
THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVIcE 84-93 (1982). Incidentally, an informal and unscientific
sampling by the authors of strikers and working controllers and their supervisors, employed
in several different regions, has indicated, as might be expected, sharp disagreement as to
whether the Jones Report's picture of the working environment before and after the strike
was accurate, too negative, or too rosy.
M6See, e.g., CORSON REPORT, supra note 165, at 8-9, 97, reprintedin 1981-82 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 568-69, 657.
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come a factor in the legislative reassessment not only of a compensation package for controllers, but also, and more broadly, of the
existing structure of collective bargaining for government employees. These considerations presumably have influenced the FAA's
decision not to challenge details of the report but to promise action
designed to improve working conditions and relations between controllers and supervisors. The FAA's reaction1 6 to the Jones Report
will be seen by some as giving support to PATCO's claims that a
strike was necessary to protect the morale and health of the con169
trollers and the safety of the system.
E.

Second Thoughts About Amnesty

Even before the issuance of the Jones Report on March 17,
1982, there were proposals from both the press 170 and Congress 7
1" In an interview approximately one year after the strike, FAA Administrator Helms
accepted the questioner's premise that relations were poor and then described remedial action, including the establishment of a four-year university training program for supervisors
and of a human-relations policy committee under his chairmanship. See U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1982, at 51. Mr. Helms also declared:
"As for complaints of stress, I just do not believe controllers have been grossly
overworked. Before the strike began, I was shocked to find that our average controller
was actually directing planes only 41/2
hours each day.
"Most of the stress talked about is episodic stress-where some event occurs."

Id.
A newspaper story suggested that at some facilities poststrike cooperation was being
replaced by prestrike hostilities and frictions, that some controllers were being forced to
work excessive overtime, and that the increased work loads on a smaller number of controllers threatened safety. The FAA challenged these charges. See Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1981, at 1,
Col. 1.
149 We will return to the Jones Report in our concluding observations. See infra note
316 and accompanying text.
170 The Chicago Tribune urged President Reagan to begin rehiring penitent strikers,
Chicago Trib., Aug. 20, 1981, at 14, col. 1, while the New York Times urged rehiring on the
government's terms, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1981, at E16, col. 1. Even loyal supporters of the
President suggested rehiring some strikers. See, for example, the remarks of Representative
Kemp and the essay by William Safire reprinted in 127 CONG. REc. E5666-67 (daily ed. Dec.
8, 1981).
171 The day after the strike began, Representative Conyers, challenging the distinction
between public and private employees as a "fiction," introduced H.R. 4375, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981), a bill giving all federal employees, including postal workers, the same right to
strike enjoyed by employees in the private sector. See 127 CONG. REC. H6009 (daily ed. Aug.
4, 1981). To facilitate the Administration's resolution of the impasse, that bill made the
grant of the right to strike retroactive to January 1, 1981. Id. Similarly, on December 16,
1981, Representative Jeffords introduced H. Res. 309, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), calling on
President Reagan to lift his ban on rehiring the strikers. See 127 CONG. REC. H9929 (daily
ed. Dec. 16, 1981). On October 2, 1981, 37 House Democrats sent a letter to President Reagan asking him to reopen negotiations with PATCO. 127 CONG. REc. E4690 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1981). The most complete proposal was Representative Ford's bill, which would have permitted selective rehiring of fired controllers. See H.R. 6310, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §3 (1982);
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for relaxation of the Administration's policy against reinstatement
of the ex-strikers. Such proposals implicated a complex range of
considerations: compassion for individual strikers, their moral and
legal accountability, and the interests of nonstrikers; the welfare
and safety of the air transportation industry and of other firms
and employees injured by its contraction; the costs of training new
controllers; the credibility of the President; and the deterrent effect of the antistrike law. It is to these matters that we now turn.
First, a sense of compassion supported an end to the serious
losses already suffered by many strikers, the unoffending firms,
and their workers injured by the strike's spillover effects. Curtailment of traffic had, moreover, inflicted costs and inconvenience on
some established carriers172 and inhibited competition from new
ones. Finally, training of replacement controllers would be a long
and expensive proposition.1 73 Amnesty would substantially reduce
all of those losses.
The pleas for compassion had an obvious appeal. 'The government had, after all, treated the strikers with unprecedented severity.' 4 In a society that depends on plea bargaining (and concomi-

H.R. REP. No. 560, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 14, 16, 18, 23, 24 (1982). Helms and Lewis later
charged that this bill was a dilatory tactic against the Administration's bill, H.R. 5038, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which would have given the working controllers approximately the
same terms agreed to on June 22, 1981, but rejected by the PATCO membership. See [JulyDec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 978, at 9-10 (1982).
172 See September 1981 Hearings,supra note 148, at 259-60.
It has been suggested that the strike served as a cover for the reinstitution of regulation. See October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 113, 183-84; Thayer, Strike Means
FriendlySkies for Airlines, THE ALANTmIC, Dec. 1981, at 14, 18-19. But there is no evidence
to indicate that the FAA's contingency plan, which originated during the Carter Administration, was drawn with an eye to undermining deregulation. Furthermore, the strike's effects
on various airlines were so uneven as to militate against a broad consensus in favor of reregulation through allocation of reduced flights. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug.
10, 1981, at 14, 14-17; id., Aug. 17, 1981, at 18, 20-23. See also Memorandum from Office of
Economic Analysis to Civil Aeronautics Board, supra note 146, reprinted in 1982 Hearings,
supra note 146, at 178.
173 Administrator Helms suggested that $160,000 was the total cost of training one fullperformance controller, reflecting both salary during training and expected attrition. See
October 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 29, 31, 33-34. He also predicted air traffic would
reach prestrike levels in 21 months. 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 5, at 353. But see H.R.
REP. No. 560, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1982) (view that it would take longer). Ten months
after the strike, traffic reached 90% of prestrike levels. See Chicago Trib., Aug. 3, 1982, at 3,
col. 1.
174 By early March 1983, the regional offices of the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) had completed the almost 11,000 appeals by air controllers fired as a result of the
strike and had reversed the FAA and ordered reinstatement of only 295 controllers. The
FAA has claimed a higher number of reversals (350); neither agency could explain the discrepancy. The FAA had rehired 120 of those reinstated and was considering whether to
rehire the rest or appeal the reinstatement orders to the Board's Washington Office. An
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tant light sentences for first offenders) to clear its docket of cases
involving violent crimes, a permanent bar against federal reemployment as air controllers seemed to lack proportionality. It was
also suggested that the strikers' offense-engaging in a strike
-could be closely likened to a civil liberty in a free society.1 75 In
any event, usually influential voices urged that the President, having shown his strength, should now show his compassion.17
A counterpoint against such pleas was, of course, the adverse
impact that reemployment of the strikers could have on the morale
of the nonstriking controllers, harmony in the work place, and the
efficiency and safety of the system. Operations in the face of
strikes, legal or illegal, typically generate strong feelings as well as
serious risks of violence, a point frequently neglected in public discussions. Although the air controllers' strike had been free from
massive violence, there were special reasons for concern that amnesty would lead to a high level of tension in air control facilities.
The resentment of the strikers would no doubt be deep because of
the unequivocal character of both their miscalculation and their
defeat. That defeat was even more embittering because some strikers saw nonparticipation as a "stab in the back" by those who
would have shared the benefits of victory. Nor would such resentment have been eased by the sense of righteousness that is likely
to be felt by those who, after resisting group pressure, obey the law
and by those who defy it on the basis of their perception, real or
pretextual, of some higher law.
These speculations were reinforced by more concrete and perhaps more compelling considerations. There were claims that opponents of the strike had been not only vilified but also subjected
to harassment that had endangered air traffic. 77 Furthermore, proponents of the strike, when they had expected to cripple air travel
and to gain a quick victory, had made it clear that they would
additional 125 controllers had been reinstated as a result of an internal FAA review of its
firing procedures, thus bringing the total already reinstated to 245. See Aviation Daily, Mar.
4, 1983, at 27. These figures obviously suggest that the Reagan Administration has so far
successfully maintained its original hard-line stance against the strikers.
1 See Magnuson, supra note 156, at 18 (ACLU's position); Chicago Sun-Times, Aug.
9, 1981, at 2, col. 1; cf. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885
(D.D.C.) (per curiam) (Wright, J., concurring), afl'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
176 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1981, § 4, at 16, col. 1. But cf. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1982, at 28,
col. 1 (seemingly accepting the government's replacement of strikers, but arguing for
"tough-minded reforms" in air traffic safety).
17 See Skirlick, Why One PATCO Man Didn't Strike, Fed. Times, Nov. 1, 1981, at 1;
infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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hound nonstrikers out of the controllers' profession.1"" One court
had indeed found that during a prior job action, harassment by a
PATCO local had compromised the control function and inflicted
substantial pecuniary and psychological damage on a maverick
controller. 179
It was not clear how extensive or durable the frictions between
strikers and nonstrikers would be. But in the months after the
strike, there was special concern that those frictions might preclude the "cooperation, coordination, and trust" among air controllers necessary for safe operations.1 80 That consideration, along with
a background of animosities, helps explain why a Roper poll
showed that fifty-eight percent of the working controllers opposed
rehiring any strikers under any conditions. 181 The obvious conclusion is that compassion for the strikers collided directly with concern for both safety and the sentiments of those controllers who
had faithfully discharged their responsibilities to the government
during and after the 1981 strike.
There were two other considerations touching the President in
a special way. He and his subordinates, in trying to avert the
strike, had warned that strikers would lose their jobs as air controlSee Minutes of Sacramento valley Cluster, supra note 107, at 4, which stated:
END OF STRIKE POLICY:
Any non-striking member or non-member who goes to work during the strike will not
be welcome in the ATC profession. Peer pressure will be exerted upon them when the
strike is over to the extent that they will be forced out of the profession, in a maximum
of 3 years. If they get tired of the pressure and try to go to another facility, their name
will be forwarded to the new facility and it is highly unlikely that that person will ever
complete a training program at another facility.
179 Anthan v. PATCO, 521 F. Supp. 1, 8 (E.D. Mo. 1980), vacated in part, 672 F.2d 706
(8th Cir. 1982).
1o FLIoHT SAFETY FOUNDATION, A SAFETY APPRAISAL OF THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 15 (1982), reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 247, 267. The Foundation, at
the request of the FAA, had reviewed poststrike air safety and, for reasons much like those
set forth in the text, had recommended against the rehiring of air controllers for work in the
towers. The Foundation, a private group, had based its report on a survey by a 16-member
task force, made up of officials from the Air Force, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and private safety groups. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5,
at 253-54; see Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1982, at 20, col. 5.
181 See [Jan.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 957, at 9 (1982). By contrast, only
10% indicated that the striking controllers should be rehired unconditionally, with the remainder favoring rehiring under certain conditions. For the latter group, whether a striker
had "actively favored the strike" appeared to be the most important factor regarding reinstatement. See B. Roper, Chairman, The Roper Organization, Inc., Testimony before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 22-23 (Mar. 25, 1982) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Roper Poll]. Mr. Roper's testimony also included unsolicited statements from controllers, illustrating the diverse opinions and intense
feeling generated or exposed by the strike. Id. at 15-17, 19-21, 30-39.
178
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lers-forever. 18 ' The law, it was urged, left him no alternative. Discharge was plainly within his discretion. Whether he also had authority to grant amnesty is a question explored below.183 Even if
such power existed, its exercise would have involved some cost to
presidential credibility. To be sure, some had urged that the President's direct involvement was unfortunate in that it had locked
him in and destroyed his capacity for conciliation.8 4 It was also
said that his two-day ultimatum followed by mass discharges had
been too severe and hasty. 85 But whatever the wisdom or practical
significance186 of those steps, they had been taken, and a shift, especially a quick one, to a softer stance would have involved costs to
the future credibility of the President. Nevertheless, such shifts
are not new to presidents in general and President Reagan in particular. It was not merely consistency but also operational factors
that had to be weighed. And there was one additional question,
which we discuss below, involving the extent to which the law confined presidential discretion.
III.

A.

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The Strike Ban: Historical and Constitutional Considerations

The prohibition against strikes by federal employees is currently contained in three statutory provisions. The most important, 5 U.S.C. § 7311,287 bars from federal employment any person
182See President's Statement Concerning Air Traffic Controllers Strike, 17 WEEKLY
Con'. PREs. Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981).
183 See infra notes 245-76 and accompanying text.
18 See Isaacson, From the Editor: PresidentReagan's Handling of the PATCO Strike:
Boldness with (or without) Wisdom?, 7 EmPL. REL. L.J. 343 (1981); Bus. WK., Aug. 17, 1981,
at 26; Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1981, at 21, col. 3.

185 See Isaacson, supra note 184, at 343-45; Magnuson, supra note 156, at 18 (quoting
Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO President, as calling Reagan's action "'harsh and brutal
overkill' ").
186The present authors agree with close observers of the events surrounding the 1981
strike who have told us that the momentum behind the strike and the confidence of the
strikers were so strong that the extension of the ultimatum for another day or so would not
have made much difference in the number of those returning to work. These conjectures
aside, a longer ultimatum might have avoided criticism that the President acted hastily. The
President's simple appeal to the controllers' duty under their oath and the law was incom-

patible with any extended ultimatum. Strictly speaking, the oath was broken by the shortest

strike, but not even the President adopted that inflexible approach. For possible explanations of the length of the ultimatum, see infra text following note 270.

An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States or the government of the District of Columbia if he(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

187

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of
our constitutional form of government;
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who participates in a strike, asserts the right to strike against the
government, or is a member of a government employee organization that asserts that right. This section also bars federal employment of those who advocate overthrow of constitutional government. The second provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1918,188 makes violations
of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 a felony.1 81 The third provision, 5 U.S.C. §
7116,190 declares striking by a labor organization to be an unfair
labor practice. In addition, 5 U.S.C. § 7120(f)1 91 provides for decertification of a union that engages in a strike; 18 U.S.C. § 2,192 the
accessory provision, makes it unlawful'to aid or abet anyone in violating the statutory prohibition.
1. History. The current prohibitions evolved from a casual
1946 appropriation rider into a more elaborate and durable body of

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or
(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the
United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of
Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the
United States or the government of the District of Columbia.
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976). The proscription against "assertion" of the right to strike has been
invalidated. See infra note 241.
188 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976) provides in pertinent part "Whoever violates the provisions
of section 7311 of title 5 [see supra note 187] . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both."
I'l Anyone who violates 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976) is guilty of a felony and is subject to a
term of imprisonment not to exceed one year.
It has been suggested that this provision does not in fact make striking itself a criminal
offense, but only the act of "accept[ing]" or "hold[ing]" a federal position during participation in a strike. Under this view, there is no violation of § 7311, and hence of § 1918, if a
striker has been discharged; in such a case, the striker does not accept or hold a position
with the federal government. But this is an excessively literal interpretation of the statute,
one that would both make the criminal provision-§ 1918-practically meaningless and
frustrate the purposes made clear by the legislative history. See infra notes 193-235 and
accompanying text. The intent of Congress was to ensure that federal employees who have
gone on strike would be subject to criminal sanctions; that intent would be defeated if the
criminal provision could be invoked only against current federal employees. This conclusion
is reenforced by our conclusion that a mandatory discharge requirement covers those found
to have been on strike. See infra notes 246-71 and accompanying text.
'go 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
For purposes of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization(7)(A) to call, or participate in, a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown, or picketing
of an agency in a labor-management dispute if such picketing interferes with an
agency's operations, or
(B) to condone any activity described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph by
failing to take action to prevent or stop such activity ....
5 U.S.C. § 7120(f) (Supp. V 1981).
192 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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legislation, the first piece of which was passed in 1955 and the last
in 1978. The original rider, 193 which was added on the Senate
floor, 19 4 barred the payment of salaries or wages to "any person
who engages in a strike against the Government of the United
States" and carried a penalty of one year's imprisonment, a $1000
fine, or both." 5
In 1947, Congress added a similar provision as section 305 of
the Taft-Hartley Act. 9 6 Section 305 made it unlawful for federal
employees to strike and provided that any federal strikers would
be discharged from federal employment, forfeit any civil service
197
status, and be ineligible for reemployment for three years.
In 1955, a new provision, the forerunner to the current statutes, 1 8 was added as a single section, 5 U.S.C. § ll8p. 9 9 The sponsor of that provision, Representative Bennett, presented it as an
uncontroversial codification and consolidation of existing law, noting that similar provisions had been included in most appropriation bills since 1946.200 The accompanying House report also expressed a clarifying and consolidating purpose. 20 1 According to that
193 See Pub. L. No. 79-419, § 201, 60 Stat. 262, 268-69 (1946).
,9192 CONG. REC. 6945-46 (1946). The amendment was agreed to without discussion,

the only comment being that the amendment was "in the usual form." Id. at 6946 (statement of Sen. Hayden).
"' Third Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 79-419, § 201, 60 Stat. 262,
268-69 (1946). The same language appeared in subsequent appropriations bills. See H. REP.
No. 1152, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), incorporated in S. REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2873.
I" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 305, 61 Stat.
136, 160 (1947), repealed by Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, § 4(3), 69 Stat. 624,
625.
" Id. The Taft-Hartley provision was designed to be "a permanent part of the law
instead of having it tacked onto appropriations bills," 93 CONG. REC. 6441 (1947) (remarks
of Sen. Taft), but antistrike riders continued to be added until 1955, see To Prohibit the
Employment by the Government of Persons Who are Disloyal, Hearings on H.R. 617 and
H.R. 6590 Before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Hearings].
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976).
199 Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, 69 Stat. 624 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7311 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976)) ("An Act to prohibit the employment by the
Government of the United States of persons who are disloyal or who participate in or assert
the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and for other purposes")
(originally codified at 5 U.S.C. § 11 8 p (1964)).
200 1955 Hearings,supra note 197, at 4-8. Representatives of the Department of Justice
stated that, in practice, all government employees were already required to affirm that they
would not strike against the government. Id. at 27 (statement of Harold Koffsky); letter
from William P. Rogers, Department of Justice, to Representative Murray (Apr. 25, 1955),
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.
CODE CONG.
201

& AD. NEws 2873, 2875-76.

H.R. REP. No. 1152, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), incorporatedin S. REP. No. 1256,
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report, the relevant provisions of more narrowly focused statutes,
such as the Taft-Hartley Act, were "repeated" in the legislation. 0 2
There was no explanation of why the more explicit language of the
Taft-Hartley Act was not adopted or, more particularly, why the
three-year ban on reemployment was dropped-a question to
20 3
which we return below.
The 1955 statute was passed with only modest comment on
the merits of federal antistrike policy; the discussion concentrated
on the bill's "security" and "loyalty" provisions. 20 4 The legislators'
general attitude toward the enactment was captured by a statement of the chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service: The provision would "protect the Government against
those who would destroy it. . . .[This bill] involves the subject of
disloyalty to our country, and you are punishing a person, giving
him a year and a day in jail,' which is very little for a man who has
betrayed the Nation and its liberties."2 0 5 Strikers were thus to be
given the same treatment as those who advocated the overthrow of
constitutional government.
There was little further discussion of the no-strike provisions
until Congress undertook to supplant previously effective executive
orders 06 by comprehensive legislation for federal labor-management relations. In the committee hearings and debates that preceded the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978,207 the no-strike provisions of federal law for the first time
attracted considerable congressional discussion.
Title VII was the product of several years of extensive discussion and compromise, much of which centered on the problem of
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2873, 2873.
202 Id.

at 2, incorporatedin S. REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), reprinted

in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2873, 2874.
On the consolidating purpose of the 1955 provision, see id. at 1-2, incorporated in S.
REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2873, 2873.
o See infra text following note 273.
204 See 101 CONG. REc. 10,765-66, 12,299 (1955).
• 1955 Hearings, supra note 197, at 12 (statement of Chairman Tumulty).
20 For examples of such orders, see Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Comp.,
at 61, reprinted in SuBCOMM. ON POSTAL PERSONNEL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVuL SERVICE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CrVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978, at 1244 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Exec.
Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R., 1959-1963 Comp., at 521, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra, at 1211.
20I Pub. L. No. 95-454, tit. VII, §§ 701-703, 92 Stat. 1191-217 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
7101-7135, 7211 (Supp. V 1981)).
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federal employee strikes. We offer a brief outline of the pertinent
history as background for the subsequent consideration of the impact of the antistrike provisions on the strikers' eligibility for reinstatement and reemployment.
In 1977, Representative Clay introduced a bill providing for a
federal labor-management relations system."' The bill sought to
expand the scope of collective bargaining for federal employees to
encompass pay practices, hours, lay-offs, promotions, and government rules and regulations.2 0 9 Most of these items had been specifically excluded from bargaining under previous executive orders.21 0
Although the bill outlined more flexible procedures for resolving
impasses,2 11 it retained the existing policy, making strikes unfair
labor practices. 21 2 H.R. 1589, a similar labor-management relations
bill introduced by Representative Ford,21 3 delineated an even
broader scope for collective bargaining, proposed an alternative
procedure for settling impasses based on the Canadian system, and
included a limited right to strike.2 4
During the relevant hearings, there was extensive testimony
on the appropriate scope of collective bargaining and the provision
of compulsory arbitration as a strike substitute. 215 Furthermore,
208

H.R. 13, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATr

HISTORY, supra note

206, at 121. See Improved Labor-ManagementRelations in the Federal Service, Hearings
on H.R. 13 and H.R. 1589 before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service (pt. 1), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977) (statement of Representative Clay) [hereinafer cited as 1977 Hearings].
209 H.R. 13, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7103(11), (13) (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 206, at 127, 128.
210 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970 Comp., at 861, 868-69,
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 206, at 1251-52.
21 Section 7117 of the bill outlined in some detail a variety of procedures for resolving
impasses. H.R. 13, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7117 (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 206, at 158-60.
212 Id. § 7115(b)(7), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 206, at 152.
213 H.R. 1589, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 206, at 183.
"I Section 7 of H.R. 1589 set forth an impasse resolution procedure that included compulsory mediation and fact finding with advisory recommendations. Id. § 7, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 206, at 207. Recommendations were to be binding upon
consent of the union. Id. § 7(b), reprinted in LEGISLATr HISTORY, supra note 206, at 208.
Section 9 guaranteed the right to strike in certain circumstances but allowed injunctions in
case of danger to public health and safety. Id. § 9, reprinted in LEGISIATIE HISTORY, supra
note 206, at 13. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 208, at 102-05 (statement of Representative
Ford). This scheme is essentially equivalent to the Canadian system. See Ponak, PublicSector Collective Bargaining, in UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS INCANADA 343 (J. Anderson & M. Gunderson eds. 1982).
218 See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 208, at 13-15 (statement of Kenneth
Meiklejohn, AFL-CIO), 31-32 (statement of Kenneth Blaylock, American Federation of
Government Employees), 107-11 (statement of Vincent Connery, National Treasury Em-
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several federal union leaders supported the legalization of strikes.
Nevertheless, conscious of the controversial nature of such proposals, they expressed their willingness to table that question in the
interest of reaching a consensus on a new statute. 1 8
In 1978, two civil service bills (H.R. 11280217 and S. 2640218)
were introduced to include Title VII, a codification of the then existing labor-management relations provisions. 2 ' 9 After extensive
debate, accompanied by concessions to the Administration, Title
VII, as enacted, kept the scope of mandatory bargaining narrow
220
and reaffirmed the antistrike policy.
Rather than weakening the antistrike policy, Title VII added
several provisions that reflect continued legislative opposition to
federal employee strikes. First, as we have noted, section
7116(b)(7) declared strikes to be unfair labor practices, subject to
the remedial authority of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
("FLRA"). 22 1 Second, section 7120(f) provides that upon finding a
violation of section 7116(b)(7), the FLRA "shall. . . revoke" the
union's certification as exclusive representative.2
Third, section
7103 provides that strikers are not "employees" under the statutory definition of that term 223 and that organizations that participate in "the conduct of a strike against the Government" are not
"labor organizations" under the Act. 4 Finally, Title VII provided
a new antistrike tool, namely, interim injunctions at the request of
the FLRA.22
ployees Union).
lie See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (statement of Kenneth Meiklejoh, AFL-CIO), 35 (statement
of Kenneth Blaylock, American Federation of Government Employees), 140-41 (statement
of John Leyden, PATCO). Mr. Leyden of PATCO, however, did imply that failure to pass
any labor-management relations legislation would so frustrate workers that there might be
strikes: "[Y]ou're going to see repeats of what happened in the Postal Department in 1970.
The work force that we represent today is not willing to sit back ..
" Id.
217 H.R. 11280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
218 S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
210 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 206, at 372, 494.
120 Id. at 1.
21 See supra note 190.
11 5 U.S.C. § 7120(f) (Supp. V 1981).
"'
Id. § 7103(a)(2)(B)(v).
124 Id. § 7103(a)(4)(D).
221 Id. § 7105(g)(3). These various antistrike provisions were only one part of the comprehensive statutory scheme designed to govern labor-management relations in the federal
sector. See generally Coleman, The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Its Meaning and Its
Roots, 31 LAD. L.J. 200 (1980); Cooper & Bauer, Federal Sector Labor Relations Reform, 56
CHi.-KzNr L. REv. 509 (1980); Note, supra note 47. That scheme, embodied in Title VII,
also establishes the FLRA (the public sector counterpart of the National Labor Relations
Board), defines management and labor rights in collective bargaining, and includes proce-
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2. Constitutionalityof the Antistrike Provision.The constitutionality of the antistrike provision has been challenged on two
grounds: first, that the prohibition is an unwarranted invasion of
the "fundamental right" to strike;
second, that the statutory lan2 26
guage is impermissibly vague.
The first challenge is based on the following substantive due
process argument.22 7 The right to strike, like the right to privacy,22 8
has achieved the status of a "fundamental" right, especially in
view of the role of labor unions in promoting "desirable" or "fair"
employment conditions. 2 2 This argument is said to derive support
from the Court's recognition of a first amendment right, in the private sector, to organize and choose representatives. 23 0 Any infringement of such a right is invalid unless justified by a compelling
state interest.
The claim that the right to strike in the public sector is fundamental for constitutional purposes seems to us to lack any justification in history, precedent, 23 1 or the interests at stake. History

dures for certifying unions, settling bargaining impasses, and hearing unfair labor practice
charges and grievances.
228 See United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
227 An equal protection argument can also be advanced, challenging the distinction between the treatment of private employees, ,who are permitted to strike, and public employees, who are not. This distinction is subject to rational basis scrutiny unless a so-called
fundamental right is implicated. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166 (1980); Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 Sup. CT. REv. 127. For reasons discussed infra text accompanying notes 231-41, no
fundamental right that would give rise to heightened scrutiny, see Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), is involved, and the distinction is rational.
228 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
229 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
230 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Courts have recognized the constitutional right of public employees to join a union, as distinguished from the right to strike or indeed to "bargain" collectively. See Lodge 1858, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 894 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dicta); Orr v.
Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1970); American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun.
Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969).
23 See UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 259
(1949), where the Court voiced this view even with respect to the private sector- "[Tihe
state constitutionally could prohibit strikes and make a violation criminal ....
The right to
strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to
regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining. . . ." See also United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879
(D.D.C.) (per curiam) (upholding statute prohibiting strikes by federal employees), aff'd
mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971). But see id. at 885 (Wright, J., concurring) (noting that the validity of the antistrike statute under the fifth amendment is "a very difficult" question); School
Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.L 96, 105-06, 299 A.2d 441, 446 (1973) (Roberts,
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certainly provides no support for that contention; although the
statutory prohibition on federal employee strikes is relatively recent, the right of private employees to strike at common law was,
at best, qualified. Moreover, this common law right emerged only
during the second half of the nineteenth century with the decline
of an ill-defined doctrine of criminal conspiracy and the rise of a
test focusing on the propriety of union ends and means.2 3 2 As a
matter of federal law, the right was first given legal protection
throughout the private sector by statutes enacted during the
1930's.233 Subsequently, even the statutory right to strike in the
23 4
private sector has been subject to considerable qualification.
Statutorily-created interests have been treated as constitutionally
protected for purposes of procedural due process, 23 5 but no case
has treated such a right as fundamental for purposes of substantive due process.2 6 If education, welfare, and employment are not
fundamental as a matter of substantive due process, 2 7 one cannot
easily conclude that the right to strike against the government is
constitutionally protected. Not all important interests receive substantive protection under the due process clause.

C.J., dissenting) (concluding that public employees have a constitutionally protected right
to strike); Hanslowe & Acierno, supra note 27, at 1066-78 (offering a "case" that supports a
right to strike by public employees).
For a discussion of traditional approaches to the difficult problem of identifying "fundamental" rights, see Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship,90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). In this discussion we proceed along the conventional doctrinal lines. Nevertheless, we realize that the
"fundamental rights approach" is potentially so open-ended as to caution against dogmatic
predictions.
I" See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v.
Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), af'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); B.
MELTZER, supra note 10, at 1-36.

For a brief history of these statutes, see B. MELTZER, supra note 10, at 29-32.
'" For examples of qualifications, see UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 258-60 (1949).
See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1255-67.
Thus, for example, the holding in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), that there
is a right to a hearing before deprivation of a statutory right to welfare benefits, does not
mean that it would be impermissible to abolish welfare altogether. See Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). But cf. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969) (suggesting constitutional recognition for right to
subsistence).
" See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education is
not a fundamental right). But cf. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2383 (1982) (suggesting that
deprivation of education may give rise to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (welfare); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972) (employment). On the inquiry in general, see Brest, supra note 231;
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1245-46.
23
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Since the right to strike is not "fundamental," the prohibition
must be upheld unless it is not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest-a highly deferential test.23 We have outlined a jus-

tification for the prohibition that would readily satisfy that test.'3
Indeed, the more conventional explanations, invoking the peculiar
importance of governmental functions, are sufficient, even though
the prohibition is overinclusive in relation to those explanations.
For the same reason, an equal protection attack on the distinction
between public and private employees should fail,2 40 and there is

no basis for first amendment protection under the "symbolic
speech" cases.241
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
2" See supra notes 13-56 and accompanying text. In 1951, Professor Cox suggested that
a strike prohibition, at least in the private sector, raises serious questions under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. See Cox, Strikes, Picketing, and the Constitution, 4
VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951). As Professor Cox recognizes, however, a thirteenth amendment
attack has been foreclosed by the cases, id. at 575-76, on the ground that the employee's
right to change employers or to suspend services individually or collectively does not carry
with it a right to undertake collective action in order to alter the conditions of employment.
See, e.g., UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 134, 2 F.2d 993, 994
(N.D. Ill. 1924), af'd, 6 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1925).
We need not here pursue the questions under the due process clause that a blanket ban
on private-sector strikes might raise. See Cox, supra, at 580-81. For reasons discussed in the
text, a ban on strikes in the public sector would not raise such due process issues.
2"0 The statute has in fact been upheld as constitutional in a variety of cases. See, e.g.,
United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.) (per curiam), affd mem.,
404 U.S. 802 (1971).
The framework is set out in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968),
which suggests that a restriction on expressive conduct will be upheld
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
We have explained why the antistrike prohibition serves a substantial governmental interest. That prohibition, moreover, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since the
government is not attempting to use the strike prohibition to single out particular views for
suppression. Cf. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
(upholding application of NLRA secondary boycott provisions to longshoremen's refusal to
load and unload ships engaged in trade with the Soviet jUnion). The part of the O'Brien test
that speaks to whether "the incidental restriction ... is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance" of the government's interest, 391 U.S. at 377, might be viewed as raising
harder questions with respect to nonessential government services. There, a total prohibition might seem overbroad. But, as we have suggested, the government's interest might be
best explained as a response to the different role of market forces in the public and private
spheres. Moreover, this aspect of the O'Brien test appears quite lenient. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Role of Categorizationand Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1484-85 (1975). For earlier cases declining to protect
strikes as "symbolic speech," see UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
238
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Those who attack the antistrike statute as "void for vagueness 92 42 claim that the term "participate" is ambiguous. That argument, however, is weak. The executive branch has understood the
term to refer to the actual refusal, in concert with others, to provide services to the employing agency. 243 That interpretation is
sufficiently clear and, in addition, prevents application of the statute to activities protected by the first amendment.2 4
B.

The Question of Presidential Discretion

There was considerable public discussion of whether the antistrike statute required the President to discharge strikers or
whether it granted him discretion over that matter.2 45 Similarly,
once striking controllers have been discharged, may the President
later rehire them? These questions are quite difficult under the
statute, for a literal reading seems at odds with ordinary principles
of executive discretion and also with what is perhaps the more appealing view of congressional purposes. We first discuss the problem of discharge and then that of rehiring. We conclude somewhat
tentatively that the President is required to discharge all those
found to have been strikers, but that he has discretion both to invoke civil service procedures for discharge and to rehire discharged
strikers.
1. Discharge.At first glance, Congress seems to have answered
the question of presidential discretion unambiguously. The statute
provides that a person "may not accept or hold a position in the
335 U.S. 525 (1949); American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538
(1949).
The provision of the statute that bars "assertion" of the right to strike has been invalidated as violating first amendment rights. Police Officers' Guild v. Washington, 369 F. Supp.
543 (D.D.C. 1973); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C.
1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1971); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C.
1969). This result seems correct after Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See infra
notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
242See generally Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960).
24 See supra note 58.
244 For cases rejecting a vagueness attack, see United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229,
1233 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Amato, 534 F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
24'The question of discretion probably received most explicit attention in the President's statement that, "Now, in effect, what they did was terminate their own employment
by quitting." 17 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 869 (Aug. 13, 1981). See also the President's
Statement in 17 WEEKLY Cop. PREs. Doc. 904 (Aug. 17, 1981) that "I don't think there was
any choice but to do what we've done. Public employees cannot strike against the public."
Nevertheless, it is not clear from the latter statement whether there was not "any choice"
because of lack of discretion to choose differently or because of lack of justification for a
different exercise of "discretion."
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Government of the United States" if he "participates in a strike
; . . against the Government of the United States. 2' 46 Plainly, a
statutory declaration that a person "may not hold" a position is a
declaration of his ineligibility binding in general on the executive.
Accordingly, the statute is mandatory and suggests an unqualified
ban on federal employment of any participant in a federal strike.
Furthermore, two aspects of the legislative history support a
literal interpretation. First, the 1955 legislation, as we have observed, was intended to incorporate previous provisions that were
more specifically focused. In particular, the Taft-Hartley Act, an
antecedent provision, contained an unambiguous discharge requirement. In relevant part, that Act provided that any "individual
employed by the United States. . .who strikes shall be discharged
immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his civil service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemployment for
three years. 24 7 The pertinent committee reports on the 1955 version of the no-strike provision state that the new consolidated statute would "repeat[]" the Taft Hartley provision."" A plausible, if
not irresistible, inference is that, like the Taft-Hartley provision,
the 1955 statute was intended to be mandatory.
Second, in its 1955 form the antistrike provision was initially
included in an enactment entitled, "An Act to prohibit the employment. '24 9 Although such captions appear to lack legal force,
that title would imply that the prohibition against continued employment is mandatory. The 1955 statute said that "no person
shall accept or hold office or employment in the Government of the
United States, '250 and the change to the current language was said
not to involve any substantive change. 25 1 The pertinent report explicitly states that the "words 'may not' are used in a prohibitory
sense, i.e., 'is not authorized to' and 'is not permitted to.' ,252

246 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976). On the procedural requirements for discharge of federal employees, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 142-46 (1974); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513, 7521, 7543
(Supp. V 1981).
247 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 305, 61 Stat.
136, 160 (1947), repealed by Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, § 4(3), 69 Stat. 624,
625.
2, See generally H.R. RaP. No. 1152, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), incorporatedin S.
REP. No. 1256, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

Naws 2873, 2873-74; supra note 202 and accompanying text.
249 Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, 69 Stat. 624, 624 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7311 (1976)) (emphasis added).
250 Id. § 1.
251

S.REP. No. 1380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-21 (1966).

252

Id. at 20.
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Nevertheless, past executive practice and judicial decisions
suggest that the problem of discretion is not so easily resolved.
First, administrative practice reveals that the executive has sometimes interpreted the statute to permit, but not require, dismissal.
In the 1970's, for example, controllers participated in a "sick-out"
and failed to report to duty for about a month. Agency guidelines
fixed a sliding scale of penalties, from a one-day suspension without pay for each day of participation in the strike to removal,
which was reserved for those employees who led or encouraged
others to strike.25 There is thus an administrative interpretation
that section 7311 grants discretion to the FAA Administrator over
whether and when to discharge a striker.
Pertinent judicial decisions appear to conflict. A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit involving the Postal Service suggests that
the statutory language must be taken literally."54 Other courts have
found the matter less clear. One district court, in 1970, enjoined
the controllers from continuing to strike, but simultaneously
barred the FAA from failing to reinstate those who returned to
work.255 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the injunction
against the FAA, but declined to answer whether the statute required discharge. 2 56 And in a recent decision ordering strikers to

return to work, the Seventh Circuit suggested that an injunction
was the "only remedy available to the Government. ' 2

57

The court

concluded that termination was not required, noting that such a
requirement would have prevented the FAA from furnishing the
public with a critical service, thus perversely producing the very
result the statutory provisions were designed to prevent. 258 This

analysis is consistent with other decisions enjoining strikers and
directing them to return to work.259
See Henson v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D. La. 1970).
" See American Postal Workers v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1183 (1983). In that case, a postal worker had been discharged
by the Postal Service because of participation in a strike. The union initiated proceedings
before an arbitrator, who ordered reinstatement, pointing to mitigating circumstances that
made the discharge unduly severe. Id. at 1283. The district judge denied enforcement on the
ground that the arbitrator had ordered the service to perform an unlawful act. Id. at 1282.
Without substantial discussion, the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that section
7311 precluded reinstatement. Id. at 1286.
255See Air Transp. Ass'n v. PATCO, 313 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated in part sub
nom. United States v. PATCO, 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
156 438 F.2d at 82 n.3.
2'7 United States v. PATCO, 653 F. 2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083
(1981).
:53

2"
253

Id.

See, e.g., Henson v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. La. 1970). Note also that
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It is manifestly arguable that the administrative interpretation
and other aids to construction foreclose a literal reading of the
statute that would deny discretion to the executive. We believe,
however, that there are substantial difficulties with that argument.
The statutory language is unambiguous, and its history tends to
suggest that the words were intended to mean what they say. The
administrative practice is, of course, entitled to deference, but it is
not so consistent and of such long standing as to justify the conclusion that there has been congressional acquiescence in that
interpretation.2 6 0
We acknowledge the force of two arguments against a literal
interpretation, one from legislative purposes, the other from executive discretion. The first argument, which the Seventh Circuit accepted, is that a literal interpretation is at war with the underlying
reason for the statute, since it would require the executive to discharge all strikers and might, pro tanto, obstruct the discharge of
government responsibilities. The Seventh Circuit relied on this argument when it suggested that discharge is not feasible in light of
the primary purpose of the antistrike provision, which is to ensure
that government services are not interrupted. 6 1 Indeed, to say that
the discharge provision is mandatory might seem to deprive the
executive of a principal weapon for enforcing that provision-a
back-to-work injunction.
But there are several responses. First, the argument from statutory purposes depends on approaching the strike after, rather
than before, the fact.2 2 Congress could reasonably have believed
that a blanket bar to employment of strikers and the certainty of
dismissal would provide an effective prophylactic against federal
employee strikes. Second, to say that the executive must discharge
strikers is not to say that the executive may not also seek injunctive relief against a strike; the injunction would ban threatened
strikes, and it is that remedy that Congress wished to preserve.
Finally, it may be possible to say that the executive must discharge
in Miller v. Bond, 641 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court discussed the decision of the FAA
to suspend rather than dismiss striking controllers, and treated that decision as
unobjectionable.
16 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), was an unusual case in which the Court found
congressional acquiescence in executive practice. But in general, the mere fact that Congress
might have been made aware of executive practices is not sufficient to justify a new reading
of the statute.
"61 United States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d at 1134, 1141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
162 Cf. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289
(1983) (discussing ex ante perspective of criminal law).
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all persons found administratively to have engaged in a strike and
that the executive may also obtain a court order requiring preservation of the status quo-through an injunction that all strikers
return to work-until the administrative procedures for discharge
have run their course. Thus, the availability of an injunctive remedy against actual or threatened strikes is not inconsistent with a
literal reading of the statutory language. And to the extent that a
mandatory discharge requirement has harsh consequences in a particular situation, Congress is free to furnish a remedy.
The argument from executive discretion relies on the traditional prerogatives of the prosecutor, who has broad authority,
rooted in principles of separation of powers, to initiate civil and
criminal proceedings.2 e We do not believe, however, that a genuine
separation of powers question is raised by a literal reading of the
statute. Undoubtedly, Congress can bar the President from employing in the executive branch persons who have engaged in particular unlawful conduct.26'4 To be sure, courts are often reluctant
to interpret congressional enactments as intruding on the usual
discretion of the executive. The most obvious example is that of
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal area, where statutory enactments that public prosecutors "shall" undertake prosecutions
are understood to be permissive, not mandatory.26 5 But such decisions are understandable in light of well-established traditions of
executive immunity from judicial supervision in the area of criminal prosecutions.2 66 No such traditions apply to executive failure to
enforce administrative schemes. In such cases, clear statutory limitations result in the narrowing of executive decision.2 67 The antistrike provision is, we believe, more closely analogous to these adm.istrative schemes, for there is no longstanding history to temper a natural reading of the statutory prohibition.
Indeed in this context there do not appear to have been explicit claims of executive discretion based on an articulated legal
29 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-80
(2d Cir. 1973). For a caustic criticism of such results, see K. DAvis, ADMINmSTRATIVE LAW OF
THE SEVENTIES § 28.00-4, at 616-19 (1976).
'" In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court adopted its most expansive
interpretation of the extent to which article H protects the President in the supervision of
the executive branch. Even in that case, however, the Court made clear that the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact provisions governing the hiring and firing of civil servants.
See id. at 160.
,65 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 263.
266 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
ProsecutorialPower, 94 H.Iv. L. REv. 1521 (1981).
,67 See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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argument. Instead, the executive appears to have swept occasional
stoppages under the rug-an approach that is ambiguous because
in an imperfect world it is as consistent with the absence of discretion as with its presence. In short, the pertinent executive responses have been too sporadic, too ambiguous, or too recent to
constitute a firm practical construction limiting the meaning of the
1955 provisions.
What we have said so far suggests that once federal employees
have been determined to be strikers, discharge is mandatory under
section 7311. But this does not suggest that the executive has no
discretion to decide whom it should subject to proceedings to determine who has participated in the strike. The constraint of limited resources is a classic basis for prosecutorial discretion, and activation of the civil service mechanism for discharge can itself be
quite costly. Here, unlike in the recent context of deciding whether
to discharge those found to be strikers, traditions of executive discretion are well established. Thus, for example, the executive may
decline to initiate administrative proceedings with a view toward
discharge if it believes that the employee in question did not participate in the strike or that the limited nature of such participation 2 8 justifies initiating proceedings against certain categories of
violators but not others.
To a substantial degree this approach grants the executive discretion over enforcement of the no-strike provision, but without
authorizing him to retain those found to be strikers. Nevertheless,
the executive may not effectively nullify the statute by entirely defaulting in enforcement.26 9 The line between a complete default
and bringing discharge proceedings against a limited number of
employees engaging in a strike will not always be clear. But the
basic distinction is well established,2 70 and we do not doubt that
workable standards can be developed for identifying a substantial
prosecutorial default.
The position that discharge is mandatory may seem to cast
doubt on the legality of a grace period, such as the two days al2" On this rationale, we believe that the executive may be permitted to decline to initiate proceedings against those who have struck for extremely brief periods.
2'9 See WWHT v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Stewart & Sunstein, supra
note 32, at 1267-89. To say this is not to say, however, that there necessarily would be a
judicial remedy for failure to enforce the discharge requirement or that anyone would have
standing to argue in favor of such a remedy.
270 See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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lowed by President Reagan. But the grace period should, we believe, be viewed as a means of exercising the discretion that the
executive does have to determine whether particular workers have
been on strike. A brief grace period furnishes an objective standard
that contributes to determinations of whether strike activity has
occurred. 7 1 The grace period was thus a reasonable means of im-

plementing the discharge requirement.
In short, we conclude that the President is required to discharge all those .who have been reliably identified as having been
on strike, but that he has broad discretion in selecting the employees to be subjected to the identification procedures, that is, the
discharge mechanisms of civil service. To be sure, this form of discretion might be exercised or manipulated so as to nullify the
mandatory aspects of the antistrike law, but we believe that such
efforts at nullification could usually be identified despite the awkward issues of degree involved.
2. Rehiring. The question remains whether it would be lawful
to rehire those fired for striking. That question implicates a further problem: whether the statutory language should be understood to suggest that once someone has participated in a strike, he
is thereafter barred from "accepting" federal employment. We believe that such an interpretation should be rejected and that the
prohibition on federal employment should apply only to the period
in which the strike activity is taking place. We acknowledge that
there is some awkwardness in distinguishing between discharge
and rehiring. We believe, however, that the different results are
justified by the language, history, and purposes of the relevant
provisions.
The 1955 statute, like the current version, used the present
tense-"participates" in a strike2 7 2 -suggesting that the prohibition on employment applies, and is limited, to the period in which
the strike activity occurs. The statute is not written in the terms of
a permanent ban on employment; the phrase "has participated"
would be suited for that purpose.
The foregoing interpretation would be subject to a charge of
excessive literalism if it were based on the statutory language
alone, but our conclusion derives support from the legislative history and structure. The Taft-Hartley Act itself required only a
Compare Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972).
Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, § 1(3), 69 Stat. 624, 624 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976)).
271
'
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three-year, not a permanent, ban. 273 There is no indication that
Congress intended the 1955 consolidated legislation to convert that
temporary ban into a permanent one. Such a drastic conversion
should not be inferred from congressional silence. If no such
change is to be inferred, the 1955 statute must be interpreted either as implicitly carrying over the three-year ban or as giving the
executive discretion to determine the time for any rehiring. Of the
two possibilities, the second is preferable. It would be strange indeed for Congress to retain a three-year ban without saying so. In
the absence of any express reference to that period, the statute is
best understood as giving the executive discretion in deciding when
the striking employees should be rehired.
Moreover, an interpretation that bars rehiring former strikers
must also comprehend a bar against rehiring former advocates of
the overthrow of constitutional government or former members of
organizations that advocate such overthrow. It will be remembered
that section 7311, which contains the prohibition on employing
strikers, applies equally to ban federal employment of those who
advocate overthrow of constitutional government or are members
of organizations that do so.274 An interpretation that would impose
a permanent ban seems implausible and, with respect to former
"advocates," would also raise serious constitutional questions. 5
Finally, we believe that it is an important virtue of this solution, based on admittedly uncertain statutory language and history, that it effectively accommodates the various purposes underlying the no-strike policy. The executive has discretion to take
action against those persons who appear to have engaged in strike
activity. Once an administrative determination is made that an
employee did strike, discharge is mandatory. After discharge, the
executive may rehire the striker. To be sure, the possibility of rehiring may to some degree undermine the deterrent force of the
no-strike policy. 27 - But such strikers will lose seniority, and
mandatory discharge, together with the apparently strong possibility that the striker would not be rehired, should serve as a powerful disincentive to unlawful strikes.
3S

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 305, 61 Stat.

136, 160 (1947), repealed by Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, § 4(3), 69 Stat. 624,
624; see supra text accompanying note 247.
:74 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1976).
7' See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
2" See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
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Selective Prosecution and the Air Controllers

Of the approximately 13,000 air controllers who participated
in the strike, the Department of Justice prosecuted only seventyeight under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3).2 The Department's policy called for prosecution of certain "strike leaders." The
stated basis for that policy was that it would both maximize the
deterrent value of prosecution and facilitate the gathering of
proof.2 7 8 That approach, however, raises difficult questions of

prosecutorial discretion and selective prosecution.
It is well settled that prosecutors need not initiate proceedings
against all offenders and have considerable discretion in allocating
scarce prosecutorial resources among competing enforcement demands. 279 The unusual degree of judicial deference in this context

is attributable to the "polycentric"280 character of prosecutorial decisions: courts are institutionally ill-equipped to evaluate and improve such executive allocations of limited resources.28

1

The func-

tion of judicial review is much more easily performed with respect
to initiatives already undertaken, for in such cases courts generally
can test the legality of the particular enforcement actions without
2 82
having to evaluate an agency's overall enforcement scheme.
Notwithstanding this tradition of deference, courts have
barred prosecutors from singling out a target for prosecution on
the basis of such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or
a desire to penalize or deter the exercise of a constitutional
right.28 3 If such executive encroachment on constitutionally pro-

tected interests were permitted, the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion could shield decisions intended to discourage the exercise
of constitutional rights. Because of such concerns, it is hardly sur27 18 U.S.C. 1918(3) (1976). These figures, together with other facts discussed below,
are taken from United States v. Amato, 534 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). We do not
focus here on proceedings brought in criminal contempt, but the same basic framework
would apply.
178 534 F. Supp. at 1194.

271See generally Easterbrook, supra note 262; Vorenberg, supra note 266.
180 The term, coined by Michael Polanyi a generation ago, see M. PoLANYI, THE LOGic
OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 171 (1951), was, of course, first applied to legal
problems by Lon Fuller, see Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 -HRV.
L.
REv. 353, 394 (1978).

See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1210-11, 1269-71.
In some cases, of course, courts may be compelled to undertake similar review to
ascertain whether enforcement action was "arbitrary" under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). For general
discussion, see L. WEiNm, CinuNA PRocEss 614-47 (3d ed. 1978); Vorenberg, Narrowing
the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DuKE L.J. 651.
18
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prising that courts have not permitted the difficulties surrounding
judicial supervision of enforcement activities 2wholly
to immunize
4
enforcement decisions against judicial review.
This approach, although useful in dealing with heavy-handed
prosecutorial intrusions on constitutionally protected interests,
does not take one very far when the application of usually permissible criteria for selection involves unusual risks of chilling effects.
Two different categories of cases illustrate both the usefulness and
limits of the approach in question. In selecting violators for prosecution under the tax laws, it is clear that the government may not
indict only those who spoke out against Republican candidates.
Similarly, it would be impermissible, in enforcing the selective service laws, to prosecute only those who expressed opposition to welfare policy. But under current law the executive may single out
violators who have been most vocal in their resistance to the law
whose violation is in question. The cases have drawn a distinction
between an impermissible penalty on a constitutional right and a
proper effort to use scarce prosecutorial resources economically
and to maximize the deterrent value of punishment by bringing
suit against the most visible violators.2 85 The difference is that in
the latter situation, the statements that are the catalyst for prosecution facilitate identification of violators and are directly related
to the underlying illegality.2 88
The distinction may be illustrated by cases upholding the propriety of singling out for prosecution those selective service evaders
who have been especially vocal in opposing the selective service
laws. It is, however, impermissible to single out those who have
opposed the reelection of an elected official. 8 7 To be sure, even in
the former case there is likely to be a chilling effect on the exercise
2M

See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356

(1886).
235See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1355-57 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982);
United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d
890, 892 (9th Cir.) (noting that proper prosecutorial considerations, "such as deterrence of
widespread tax evasion, will inevitably lead to the prosecution of numerous protest violators"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182, 183 (10th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979

(1979); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307-09 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943-45 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1973). But see infra note 290 and accompanying text.
26 This argument is most forceful in the context of outspoken opponents of the nostrike law; there, the "fit" between the goal of deterrence and the persons prosecuted is
quite good. The fit is less perfect with respect to union leaders.
" See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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of first amendment rights. But in such cases, that effect is an "incidental" consequence of a legitimate effort to maximize the use of
scarce prosecutorial resources. By contrast, in the latter case the
deterrent consequence is not incidental at all, and the decision reflects a naked effort to penalize the expression of a particular point
of view.
In presenting this distinction, we do not mean to suggest that
it is immune from attack. The consequence of a prosecutorial policy directed at vocal opponents of existing law will be to deter free
speech. Consequently, there is room for argument that such a consequence is sufficient reason to reformulate existing doctrine. Indeed, there are signs of strain on that doctrine in recent cases involving prosecutorial

discretion. 88

But with respect

to the

prosecution of air controllers, the question under existing law is
whether the Justice Department's decision to prosecute strike
leaders involved an impermissible penalty on the exercise of their
constitutional right to hold union office or to speak out in favor of
the strike. That question is, in turn, closely related to those raised
in recent cases involving prosecution of tax protesters and vocal
selective service violators, where arguments based on selective
prosecution generally have failed. 8" Nevertheless, several courts
have condemned the Department's decisions with respect to the air
controllers' strike as unconstitutional selective prosecution. 90
The arguments in support of the asserted unconstitutionality
of the government's prosecution policies assume two alternative
forms. First, it is claimed that the prosecutorial decisions were
I" See United States v. McDonald, 553 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (invalidating
prosecution of union leaders); United States v. Paisley, Cr. 81-196 PHX-CLH (D. Ariz. Nov.
12, 1981) (order). See also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(suggesting that discipline is invalid if it would not have been imposed but for the exercise
of constitutional rights). For analogous cases under the Taft-Hartley Act, see NLRB v.
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982) (NLRA, as amended, violated by
more severe discipline for union officials, as such, for their participation in "wildcat
strikes"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1768 (1983); Consolidated Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 188,
111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1205 (1982); Note, DiscriminatoryDiscipline of Union Representa-

tives for Breach of Their "HigherDuty" in Illegal Strikes, 1982 Duan L.J. 900; Comment,
Disparate Treatment of Union Stewards: The Notion of Higher Responsibilities to the
Employment Contract, 43 OHIo STATE L.J. 379 (1982). See also Strobeck v. Illinois Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 772, 388 N.E.2d 912 (1979) (upholding selective discipline of

participants in public employee strike). Cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 103 S.Ct.
1467 (1983) (prohibiting disparate treatment of union officials as such under Taft-Hartley

Act).
189 In almost all such cases, arguments based on selective prosecution have failed. See
supra note 285.

2'

See United States v. McDonald, 553 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1983); United States

v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Colo. 1981).
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based on the defendants' status as union leaders. There is some
factual support for this claim. Some time before the strike (February 1981), the Justice Department, after exploring the selection of
potential targets for prosecution, prepared a list composed
predominantly of union leaders."' 1 There was also evidence that
the pertinent lists explicitly designated the targets as union representatives. Thus it might be suggested that even if it were permissible to prosecute only those who encouraged the strike, the Department did no such thing: it prosecuted union representatives,
who may or may not have been strike leaders. The second contention is that a decision to prosecute those, such as strike leaders,
who have argued in favor of the strike, is tantamount to a decision
to penalize those who have exercised their first amendment right
to speak freely.
With respect to the first contention, the critical issue is
whether it is invidious to prosecute on the basis of union leadership. Some district courts have concluded that it is. 292 These courts

reasoned that union representatives were not necessarily strike
leaders and that the Department's policy operated to single out
those in union posts regardless of actual advocacy of the strike.
But the matter is not so simple. It is not altogether clear why the
government may not conclude that, if a strike ultimately occurs,
the target of prosecution should be leaders of the union, not because they are necessarily responsible for the unlawful action and
not in order to penalize union activities, but because such prosecutions would have unusually high deterrent value. Union leaders
who have in fact engaged in the strike are by their example especially likely to have encouraged widespread violation of the law.
Apart from deterrence, the government may reasonably believe
that those in a position of trust and authority-union leaders-are
more culpable if they break the law. A related argument is one
from exemplary punishment: the executive may choose to single
out for prosecution those whose punishment will receive the most
attention, thus alerting potential violators to the possibility of
criminal sanctions. If this is the basis for prosecution, it may not
be invidious.293
291 United States v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (D. Colo. 1981). Of the over 72
persons originally named for investigation, only 31 were clearly identified as present
PATCO local officials. This suggests that the government was not directing its enforcement
efforts at union officials alone.
2' See United States v. McDonald, 553 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1983); United States
v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Colo. 1981).
This result is a natural product of the argument supra text accompanying notes 279-
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The second argument--that the government's policy imposes
an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the right to freedom of
speech-is also unpersuasive. There is a threshold question as to
whether a first amendment right is genuinely at stake. Brandenburg v. Ohio29 4 bars proscription of advocacy "of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."2 9 5 Undoubtedly, the abstract statement that striking is
necessary, or that public employees have some abstract "right" to
strike, is protected by the first amendment. 29 6 Also protected are
general statements that employees should go on strike at some
29 7
time in the future or that a strike would eventually be desirable.
One does not lose first amendment protection merely because the
unlawful conduct that was advocated actually occurred.29 8 In some
cases, however, statements by union leaders may well fall in the
unprotected class. Such unprotected speech would include specific
and concrete suggestions that strike action be taken in the immediate future, under circumstances in which it was likely that strike
action would in fact ensue. 9 In such cases, the relevant statements are unprotected under Brandenburg,and the selective prosecution problem is easily resolved.
Even if the first amendment precludes pro-strike statements
from being made criminal in and of themselves, selective prosecution of those who have assumed positions as leaders in encouraging
strike activity should not be treated as an -impermissible penalty
on the exercise of a constitutional right. The decision to prosecute
those who have both struck and encouraged a strike serves a deterrent function and in addition operates to bring the force of the law
against those most responsible for unlawful activity. 0 0 If the reason for singling out strike leaders was strike deterrence (a value

2- 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
19 Id. at 447. See generally Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 645; Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger,70 CALn. L. Rsv. 1159 (1982); Comment, Brandenburg
v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons?, 43 U. Cm. L. Rev. 151 (1975).
" See, e.g., United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C.
1971) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
' Cf. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (advocacy of unlawful demonstration protected under first amendment).
" See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3434 (1982). Brandenburg
itself provides for an inquiry into likelihood rather than the actual occurrence of the event.
" See Greenawalt, supra note 295, at 771-72; supra text accompanying note 295.
300 See United States v. Phillips, 525 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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specifically reflected in the statute involved), the selectivity was
not unlawful. And if the reason for singling them out was that
their status made them appear to bear a heavier degree of moral
responsibility for the illegal behavior, the criterion for choice also
appears legitimate. There appears to be an insufficient basis for
concluding that an invidious standard of selection lay behind the
targeting of strike leaders.3 0 1
In large part, the crucial consideration appears to be the verbal formulation of the government's conduct: Is the government's
decision to prosecute those who have led and thus have spoken in
favor of the strike based on a desire to penalize the exercise of
rights of free speech, or is it instead an effort to maximize the deterrent value of punishment-when the deterrent value would be
increased because those prosecuted have spoken out in favor of the
strike? In the cases, the distinction is accepted and treated as critical.3 02 To be sure, a governmental decision to prosecute those who
have spoken out in favor of the strike will deter the exercise of first
amendment rights. The decisive question, however, is not whether
there will be such an effect; instead it is whether the chilling effect
is the objective or is merely an incidental consequence of a permissible decision. In sum, a claim that selective prosecution is penalizing the exercise of first amendment rights is untenable when the
claim is based on speech that counsels the crime itself.
CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, the PATCO affair ended in victory for the
federal antistrike policy. For several reasons, however, the victory
is a qualified one. First, the law was enforced against many citizens
who appeared to reject its moral basis.3 03 Second, enforcement was
inevitably a costly matter for the striking air traffic controllers,
PATCO, the air transport industry, and the country.3 0 ' Further301
See

United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Amato,

534 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); cases cited supra note 285.
3o We acknowledge that like all tests turning on motivation, this approach may raise
troublesome questions in litigation--questions going to efforts to establish impermissible
purposes on the part of executive officials.
303Authentic claims of moral justification in connection with illegal strikes, among
other contexts, are, of course, difficult to distinguish from claims advanced in order to rationalize law-breaking or motivated by love of money or power rather than by moral outrage. To be sure, the controllers appeared to have their share of legitimate grievances. See
supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. But there is no evidence to suggest that their
mistreatment was so serious that their plainly illegal strike was in some sense morally justified. Indeed, such a suggestion trivializes the whole idea of civil disobedience.
3 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. Some observers maintained that
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more, it developed its own set of contradictions arising from the
barring of strikers from jobs as controllers but the lifting of the
exclusion from all other federal positions.305 Third, as these costs,
particularly those incurred by the strikers, sunk in, some of those
who had initially supported the Administration's stern response
began to waver.306 Sharp questions surfaced about the antistrike
policy 3 07 and indeed the whole range of current mechanisms gov-

erning labor relations in the public sector.30 8 The PATCO affair
thus calls for renewed consideration of the appropriate response of
the executive to actual or threatened strikes and, more generally,

PATCO's strike had damaged the whole labor movement by exposing its lack of solidarity
and muscle. Labor leaders, however, tended to dismiss such assessments, arguing that the
Administration's draconian response would encourage organization and militance. See Lublin, The Air Strike's Effect on Organized Labor, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1981, at 32, col. 3.
Such conjectures are difficult to evaluate; unions in both the private and public sector have
been subject to such strong pressures from a weak economy and tight public budgets that it
is especially difficult to isolate the longer term significance of this strike.
Other observers saw the strike as a potentially beneficial warning of the risks to the
community posed by public-employee unionism and strikes, as a watershed event, with the
government finally enforcing the law against a power-hungry and greedy union. See, e.g.,
Kilpatrick, The Air Traffic Controllers: They Struck a Blow for Tyranny, 23 NAT'L REV.
1132, 1157 (1981). But, once again, the inferences from the strike varied with the observer;
some read it as a warning about the risks and fragility of a "discriminatory" antistrike policy in a culture generally treating strikes as exercises of an important civil liberty.
306

See supra note 5.

,o 127 CONG. Rc. E5797 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1981) (Representative Oberstar); see N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § 4, at 22, col. 1; supra note 170 and accompanying text. But cf. N.Y.
Times, July 28, 1982, at 28, col. 1 (seemingly accepting the government's replacement of
strikers, but arguing for "tough-minded reforms" in air traffic safety).
30 See, e.g., Shapiro, Federal Unions: Let Them Strike or Get Rid of Them, Washington Post, Aug. 23, 1981, at Cl, coL 1.
3' Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135, 7211
(Supp. V 1981), drew on the rhetoric and the enforcement machinery applied to the private
sector by the National Labor Relations Act, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7104, 7118, 7121 (Supp. V
1981). At the same time, Congress built a large potential for frustration into Title VII. By
maintaining a narrow scope for mandatory bargaining, Congress not only sanctioned the use
of this complex machinery for only trivial issues (the so-called "parking lot" syndrome), but
also restricted the items that could be used as trade-offs. See D.M. McCabe, Mediation and
Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Government, 151-52, 197 (unpublished manuscript, 1980) (available from the Labor-Management Services Administration and Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.). By also maintaining the strike bi, Title VII removed an important pressure against protracted bargaining. Observers have marked these two departures from the private model as significant
sources of frustration. Nevertheless, deep-seated adversary relationships, ill-trained and adversarial supervisors and employees, and neglect of day-by-day flexible accommodation between them will, of course, not be remedied solely by changes in the legal framework. Thus,
serious problems persist in the Postal Service despite the expansion of mandatory bargaining for postal employees, the new procedures for impasse resolution, and the other changes
provided in 1970 by the Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). See NATIONAL AcADEMY
OF PusLic ADMINISTRATION, supra note 166, at 88-93.
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of appropriate structures governing labor relations in the public
sector."0 9
We believe that under current law, the President's responsibilities required him to respond to PATCO's challenge by measures
that necessarily involved high costs and that were not substantially
different from those ultimately adopted. On the basis of the available evidence, moreover, we conclude that the enforcement program
adopted by the Department of Justice was legally unobjectionable.
There is no serious constitutional objection to the antistrike provision. Furthermore, the prosecution policies should not be held to
contravene constitutional doctrines governing selective prosecution.
At the same time, we realize that if the federal antistrike policy can be maintained only by a succession of such costly measures,
it is likely to be changed, de facto if not de jure. If the fate of the
strikers and PATCO, along with personnel reforms, does not deter
violations of the existing law, stronger pressures on the existing
policy will result. As things now stand, an illegal strike confronts
an administration with uncomfortable choices. If an administration
responds vigorously, it risks criticism because of the human and
social costs immediately involved. If it temporizes, it risks criticism
for not doing its duty, for allowing an erosion of a legislative mandate, and for encouraging further illegalities and their attendant
costs. In either event, it is vulnerable to criticism for creating a
labor relations atmosphere in which normally law-abiding citizens
are led to violate their oaths and obligations to their government.
Concerns about such potential costs and about the antistrike
policy as a whole have led to proposals for a federal bargaining
system that comes closer to the private sector model.31 0 Such a system might include either the right to strike or alternative devices
for resolving impasses, including various forms of arbitration.3 11
Although we are conscious of the difficulties raised by the current
antistrike policy, we have not been persuaded that its abandon309 Various positions on the framework established by Title VII are set forth in A Symposium: Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 493-638 (1972); Symposium: Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891-1082 (1969).
320 See, e.g., Burton & Krider, supra note 23, at 437-38. Recent legislative proposals
include H.R. 13, H.R. 1589, and H.R. 9094, all introduced in 1977 during the first session of
the Ninety-fifth Congress. They are reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 206, at
121, 183, 235.
31 See generally ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980's, at 68-108, 241-301 (J. Stern & B.
Dennis eds. 1982); Rehmus, Varieties of Final Offer Arbitration, ARB. J., Dec. 1982, at 4,
and a series of related articles for the survey Interest Arbitrationin the Public Sector, Aiw.
J., Dec. 1982, at 4, 7-31.
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ment and the adoption of the proposed alternatives would be significant improvements on the existing policy. There is inevitable
awkwardness in assimilating the public sector to the private sector
model. Of crucial importance are three general factors: (1) the importance of many kinds of governmental services, and the difficulty
of distinguishing between those services in terms of their importance; (2) the different role of market pressures in the private and
public sectors; and (3) the concern, deriving from the separation of
powers, about the adverse impact that strikes and third party determinations of salaries and other important elements of compensation would be likely to have on Congress's discharge of its responsibilities for raising and spending money. We do not, however,
endeavor to examine here the many proposals that have been made
for reforming the structure of labor-management relations in the
public sector. Instead, we briefly invite attention to several general
considerations that have been underscored by the PATCO affair-those that seem especially important for the achievement of
sounder federal labor relations and that are likely to increase
worker satisfaction and effectiveness. These considerations take on
added significance under the existing federal antistrike policy.
First, employees are much more likely to comply with that
policy if they understand and accept its rationale. Such understanding frequently will require education that is more positive
than antistrike oaths and supporting criminal sanctions. The
PATCO affair makes clear that the failure of employees to sense
the distinctive features of the public sector is likely to undercut
the moral force of the antistrike policy and, as a consequence, to
reduce the likelihood of compliance.
Second, politicians must not use "bureaucrats" as scapegoats
for the failures of national policy, and especially those failures for
which Congress or high-level executive officials bear primary responsibility. Such rhetoric tends to intensify ill will on both sides
and is likely both to add to the strains on the antistrike policy and
to undermine morale and loyalty.
Finally, legislators, agency administrators, and supervisors at
every level must understand that the corollary of an antistrike policy should be responsiVe administration."' 2 The foreclosure of the
strike weapon in the federal sector, contrasted with its actual and
312 After this was written, Secretary Lewis, upon resigning from the DOT, said that
changing the "very, very antiquated people practices" at the FAA would be a major problem
for his successor, and predicted it would take five years. Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 19, col.
3.
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symbolic status in the private sector, invites claims of second class
citizenship, discrimination, and indifferent supervisors shielded by
the strike prohibition. It is thus especially important to promote
responsiveness to government employees through other mechanisms.3 13 These mechanisms include, of course, better training of
supervisors and careful consideration of arrangements that will expand the participation of employees and enlist their ingenuity in
solving the problems of the workplace.
We acknowledge that there are reasons to be wary of the
strong tendency to overstate what can be accomplished by more
effective channels for participation and more effective labor relations in general.3 14 Nevertheless, several observations may sharpen
the relevance of our general remarks to the air controllers particularly and the public sector generally. The first is anecdotal; it concerns a newly assigned head of a regional air traffic controllers' facility who, concerned that the facility had degenerated into a
"country club," had sought overnight reform by unilateral action.
The result was, to Washington's initial bewilderment,31 5 that the
air controllers at the facility who had not been expected to honor
the 1981 strike call did so, and overwhelmingly.
The second consists of the importance of taking seriously the
recommendations of task forces appointed because of job action or
other apparent crises. Such recommendations frequently seem to
be accepted when made and then gather dust until the next crisis
when they are recycled by another task force. Naturally, we appreciate the usefulness of task forces both as lightning rods and as

313

For suggestions designed to alleviate antagonisms in the Postal Authority, see NA-

TIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 166, at 89-93. These suggestions,

although conventional, appear equally pertinent with respect to air traffic controllers. See
generally JONES REPORT, supra note 7, reprinted in 1981-82 Hearings,supra note 5, at 399.
34 See I. BERG, M. FREEDMAN & M. FREEMAN, MANAGERS AND WORK REFORM 142-70,
205-20 (1978).
3'5 The source of this anecdote is an FAA official in Washington. A controller who
struck while employed at the facility involved also described the new head as given to unilateral action.
There seems to be little question that the facility needed change; employees apparently
slept during working hours and went home before their shift ended. These deviations from
the official work schedule seem to have been related to overmanning of the facility. Our
point is not to condone such departures in the work schedule. Rather, it is that Washington
did not seem to realize that difficulties existed at the facility and that their primary source
was overmanning. Similarly, the new regional head seemed to have ignored the familiar difficulties inherent in instant and unilateral reform of established bad practices. To be sure,
sometimes "shock treatment" by a new head may be warranted, and we are not presuming
to pass judgment on the tactics involved. But there seems at least to have been a failure of
communication between Washington and the field.
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sources of relatively disinterested and expert advice. But surely the
oversight mechanisms in the agencies and Congress, after determining the merits of findings and recommendations, should, by periodic inquiries and reports, show to all concerned, and especially
the employees, that the recommendations were seriously evaluated
and given life, day by day, unless good cause for not doing so is
3 16
shown.
The third point relates to the conduct of public officials who
question the antistrike prohibition as a matter of principle or have
important constituents who oppose that prohibition and who expect at least a show of support by elected officials. It is critical for
such officials to remember that when strike fever is high, the union
hall is scarcely an appropriate forum for supporting an impending
strike or (what may be interpreted as the same thing by the audience) the immediate repeal of the strike prohibition. That forum is
especially ill-suited if an official glosses over either the legal obligation imposed by existing statutes or the risks to those who defy the
law. The usual obligations of elected officials are even more insistent when a politician remains a risk-free spectator while using
rhetoric that may encourage others to mount the barricades and
eventually to face serious consequences.
Indeed, the guidelines with which we conclude would presumably have been widely accepted, at least as abstractions, before the
PATCO strike. As we have seen, that strike raises difficult issues
with respect to labor relations policy and the proper conduct of
federal unions and officials. Above all, however, this melancholy
episode is probably best regarded as a reminder, like most minor
and major tragedies after the event, of the high costs of disregarding the obvious.

,ISThe FAA requested the Jones Committee to review the Agency's labor-relations performance, one year after the release of the Committee's report. The Committee concluded
that there had been "'a significant start' in improving conditions. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1983, at 6, col. 1 (midwest ed.) (quoting unnamed source). That conclusion was apparently
based on conversations with the new Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole and FAA
Administrator Helms, and not on conversations with air controllers. Id. See Gov'T EMPL.
REL. RFP. (BNA) No. 1008, at 784 (Apr. 11, 1983).

